

**Supreme Court of the United States**

October Term, 1971

No. 71-1051

**PARIS ADULT THEATRE I,**  
*Petitioner,*

v.

**LEWIS R. SLATON,** As District Attorney,  
Atlanta Judicial Circuit, and  
**HINSON McAULIFFE,** As Solicitor General of  
the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia,  
*Respondents.*

**PARIS ADULT THEATRE II,**  
*Petitioner,*

v.


**LEWIS R. SLATON,** As District Attorney,  
Atlanta Judicial Circuit, and  
**HINSON McAULIFFE,** As Solicitor General of  
the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia,  
*Respondents.*

**ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA**

**MOTION OF CHARLES H. KEATING, JR., FOR LEAVE TO  
FILE A BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT  
OF RESPONDENT WITH BRIEF ANNEXED**

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On Writ Of Certiorari From The  
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MOTION OF CHARLES H. KEATING, JR., FOR LEAVE TO  
FILE A BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT  
OF RESPONDENT WITH BRIEF ANNEXED

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Charles H. Keating, Jr., (hereinafter referred to as Moving Party) respectfully moves, pursuant to Rule 42(3) of the Rules of the U. S. Supreme Court, for leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae in support of the Respondents, Hinson McAuliffe, as Solicitor General of the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia, and Lewis R. Slaton, as District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit.



Moving Party has a special interest in the subject matter of this appeal, having devoted considerable time, study and effort to assisting law enforcement in combating the spread of obscenity in the Nation: first, as the founder and co-counsel for Citizens for Decent Literature, Inc., and more recently as a member of the Presidential Commission on on Obscenity and Pornography. Moving Party is also the appellee in an obscenity case pending before this Court, entitled, "A Motion Picture Film Entitled 'Vixen', Russ Meyer, Eve Productions, Inc., Malibu, Inc., and Clarence P. Gall v. State of Ohio ex rel Charles H. Keating, Jr., October Term 1971, No. 71-599, as to which this Court on January 12, 1972, requested a response.<sup>1</sup> The latter appeal was carried over to the 1972 October Term without this Court having taken action thereon.

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<sup>1</sup>In Moving Party's response thereto, see Motion to Affirm at pages 13-18, this Court was urged to grant plenary review in the "Vixen" appeal for several reasons: 1. The appeal involved a civil matter and was limited to the obscenity vel non issue; and 2. the record presented ideal "facts" for review, which included (a) one of the defendants was Producer Russ Meyer, the "King" (and very first) of the pandering motion picture producers; (b) the testimony of defense witness, film historian Arthur Knight, who candidly traced the erosion which has taken place since Russ Meyer started it all, and Russ Meyer's participation therein: (See also Arthur Knight's "tout" of "School Girls" in the Los Angeles Times "Cinema Theatre" ad of Oct. 7, 1972, at Appendix F, page 3) and (c) the testimony of plaintiff's witness, Mr. Melvin Anchell, a practicing psychiatrist and author of "Sex and Sanity," who very logically explained the psychiatric basis for the prescription of obscenity (and this Court's holding in Roth-Alberts, 354 U.S. 476, 485, that it was the universal judgment of civilized nations that obscenity should be restrained). The members of this Court, having viewed "Magic Mirror," produced several years after "Vixen" should make a comparison of the same with "Vixen" (photography, content, musical sound track, etc.) and ask themselves if justice does not require that a case, dealing directly with the producer, be handed down for the enlightenment of and as a warning for those in the trade. See Appendix F, pp 8-11 for Santa Monica article on James R. Haskin, Executive Producer of "Magic Mirror".

The grant of a writ of certiorari herein brings before this Court for oral argument, the first obscenity case dealing with a motion picture film since the grant of a writ of certiorari ten years ago in *Ohio v. Jacobellis*.<sup>2</sup> In *Jacobellis*, this Court reviewed the felony conviction of Nico Jacobellis, manager of the Heights Art Theater in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, for exhibiting the French imported film "Les Amants" (The Lovers) and examined the interdependent "obscenity" and "scienter" issues, which in the following years have continued to plague this Court.<sup>3</sup> Here in the *Paris Adult*

<sup>2</sup>Jurisdiction was first noted at the commencement of the 1962 October Term. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 371 U.S. 808, 9 L.Ed.2d 52, 83 S. Ct. 28 (Oct. 8, 1962). After argument without decision during that term, the case was restored to the docket. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 373 U.S. 901, 10 L.Ed.2d 197, 83 S. Ct. 1288 (Apr. 29, 1963). Re-argument did not occur until late in the 1963 October Term (Apr. 1, 1964) with this Court's no-clear majority decision being handed down on the last day of that term. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 84 S. Ct. 1672 (June 22, 1964).

The *Jacobellis* decision presents only the law of the case and is not a constitutional precedent which binds this Court. In that decision, Justices Warren, Clark and Harlan dissented and Justices Black and Douglas refused to sit in judgment on the merits and apply the law of the land in *Roth v. U.S.*, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1314, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (June 24, 1957), which holds obscenity legislation constitutional. Of the four remaining Justices, Justice White's vote without opinion can, with reason, be attributed to the criminal aspects of the case and the unfortunate fact that Jacobellis, as an alien and convicted felon, would be subject to a denial of citizenship. Compare Justice White's dissenting vote on the same day in the civil case, *Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein* (Tropic of Cancer), 378 U.S. 577, 12 L.Ed.2d 1035, 84 S. Ct. 1909 (June 23, 1964). Justice Stewart erroneously applied a "hard-core pornography" reasoning which this Court, in reviewing a state obscenity conviction in *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U.S. 502, 508, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 61, 86 S. Ct. 958 (Mar. 21, 1966), held not to be the law.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, the compromising result reached in the *Redrup* and *Austin* cases, cert. granted, limited to the "scienter" issue in *Redrup v. New York*, 384 U.S. 916, 16 L.Ed.2d 438, 86 S. Ct. 1362 (Apr. 25, 1968), and *Austin v. Kentucky*, 384 U.S. 916, 16 L.Ed.2d 438, 86 S. Ct. 1362 (Apr. 25, 1966), but decided on

Theater case the issues are not so complex - only "obscenity vel non" is being litigated, and that in relation to the fundamental power of a sovereign state, functioning in a civilized society, to proscribe the same as a matter of law, so as to preserve good public morality.

Moving Party submits that the real import of the appeal herein will be apparent only to those members of this Court who are willing to recall to mind from memory the vastly superior state of public morality (sexual) which existed when *Jacobellis* was decided just one short decade ago. Succinctly put, when one dwells for too long a period in a dung heap, the reminiscent smell of fresh air has an elusive manner of escaping the memory.<sup>4</sup> Without invoking that

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other grounds in a no-clear majority decision in *Redrup v. New York*, 386 U.S. 767, 18 L.Ed.2d 515, 87 S. Ct. 1414 (May 8, 1967).

The *Redrup* decision presents only the law of the case, and is not a constitutional precedent which binds this Court. In that decision, Justices Harlan and Clark dissented. Of the seven remaining Justices, Justices Black and Douglas refused to sit in judgment on the merits and apply the law of the land in *Rotb*, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1949, 77 S. Ct. 1314 (June 24, 1957), which holds obscenity legislation constitutional. Of the five remaining Justices, Justice Stewart erroneously applied a "hard-core" pornography reasoning which this Court, in reviewing a state obscenity conviction in *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U.S. 502, 508, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 61, 86 S. Ct. 958 (Mar. 21, 1966), held not to be the law in state cases.

<sup>4</sup>See the observations of Federal District Judge Peirson Hall, speaking on "The Monster Vice" in *U. S. v. Four (4) Books*, 289 F.Supp. 972 at 973 (Sept. 10, 1968):

"Vice is a monster of so vile a mien,  
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;  
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,  
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

"The verity of the above quotation is brought home not only by the continually increasing number of periodicals, paperbacks and other printed material glorifying things which most people regard as indecent or obscene, which flood news stands and book-racks, but also, to anyone who has read them, by the recent journeys of the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of 'obscenity' . . . ."

<sup>5</sup>From Alexander Pope's "Essay on Man."

reference, the significance of this appeal will dwindle into nothingness. and the result reached herein will become just another oscenity decision of this Court.

In Moving Party's view, this Nation is facing a moral crisis of this Court's making. It is not hyperbole to urge this Court that the result reached herein or, more properly, the rationale employed in arriving at that result, will either provide the foundation upon which our moral structures may be rebuilt, or will further excavate the grave of depravity into which this Nation is sure to tumble. The present fate of this Nation is in the hands of the individual members of this Court.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In the introduction of his book, "Jews, God and History," Max I. Dimont discusses the eight basic ways of viewing history, the last two of which he expresses as follows at page 20:

"The 'cult of personality' is the seventh face of history. Proponents of this school hold that events are motivated by the dynamic force of great men. If not for Washington, they say, there would have been no American Revolution; if not for Robespierre, there would have been no French Revolution; if not for Lenin, there would have been no Russian Revolution. Men create the events, claim these historians, in contrast to the economic interpreters who insist on the exact opposite, that events create the men.

"The eighth face of history, the religious, is both the oldest and newest concept. The Bible is the best example of this type of historical writing in the past. This way of viewing history looks upon events as a struggle between good and evil, between morality and immorality. Most Jewish history, until recent times, has been written from this viewpoint . . .

" . . . Martin Buber holds that the central theme running through their history is the relation between the Jew and his God, Jehovah. In the Jewish religious view of history, God has given man freedom of action. Man, as conceived by the Jewish existentialists, has the power to turn to God or away from God. He can act either for God or against God. What happens between God and man is history. In the Jewish way way of looking at things, success in an undertaking, for instance, is not viewed as blessed by God. A man may arrive at power because he was unscrupulous, not because God aided him. This leaves God free to hold man accountable for his actions - both successes and failures."

Governmental attorneys, in defending attacks on public morality, are prone to take the short view and limit their reply to a case by case response. This, Moving Party submits, places the people's cause at a disadvantage. Moving Party, therefore, respectfully requests that he be granted leave to file a brief *amicus curiae*, setting forth arguments on the broader view for such assistance as they may provide to the individual members of this Court.

Dated: October 11, 1972.

CHARLES H. KEATING, Jr.  
*Amicus Curiae*

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This Nation, with its roots inextricably woven in our Judeo-Christian background, is at a crossroads, and in danger of tobogganning toward destruction in the face of the warning words of Presiding Justice Turney Fox in *California v. Williamson*, 207 Cal. App. 2d, 838, 24 Cal. Rptr. 734 (Sept. 26, 1962) (Paperback book, *Fear of Incest*), cert. den. in *Williamson v. California*, 377 U.S. 994, 12 L.Ed.2d 1047, 84 S. Ct. 1902 (June 22, 1964) rehearing denied in 379 U.S. 871, 13 L.Ed.2d 77, 85 S. Ct. 13 (Oct. 12, 1964) that "other civilizations have in the past which have overindulged their appetites and cast aside decent standards of behavior." Moving Party submits that the judgment of the individual members of this Court will have its dynamic force in one direction or the other and that, in truth, men do create the events.

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Brief Amicus Curiae of Charles H. Keating, Jr., in Support  
of Respondent.

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**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

**A. BACKGROUND**

On December 28, 1970, Respondents Hinson McAuliffe, as the Solicitor General of the Criminal Court of Fulton County, and Lewis R. Slaton, as the District Attorney of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, joined as plaintiffs in filing two complaints in the Fulton County Superior Court in Atlanta,



Georgia, seeking equitable relief on public nuisance grounds<sup>2</sup> against the Paris Adult Theatre I and Paris Adult Theatre II and its operators, alleging that on December 28, 1970, the defendants exhibited to the general public for an admission charge the 16 millimeter motion picture film entitled, "It All Comes Out In The End" at the Paris Adult Theatre I (A 19-25) and the 16 millimeter motion picture film "Magic Mirror" at the Paris Adult Theatre II (A 38-43), in violation of the State obscenity statute, Georgia Code Section 26-2101. The complaints further charged that the sole and dominant theme of the films considered as a whole, applying contemporary standards, appealed to a prurient interest in sex, nudity and

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<sup>2</sup>The Georgia Supreme Court gave its approval to the "nuisance" approach to "obscenity" in *Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton* (I Am Curious (Yellow)), 180 S.E.2d 712, 716, Mar. 4, 1971, petition for certiorari denied in *Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton*, U.S. , 30 L.Ed.2d 267, S. Ct. (Nov. 9, 1971), as follows:

"We recognize the principle that equity will take no part in the administration of the criminal law. Code § 55-102. However, it has long been the rule in this State that the State has an interest in the welfare, peace, and good order of its citizens and communities, and that an action may be maintained at the instance of the prosecuting attorney to enjoin an existing or threatened public nuisance, even though the nuisance constitutes a crime punishable under the criminal laws. See: *Lofton v. Collins*, 117 Ga. 434(3), 43 S.E. 708, 61 L.R.A. 150; *Walker v. McNelly*, 121 Ga. 114(1), 115, 48 S.E. 718; *Edison v. Ramsey*, 146 Ga. 767, 92 S.E. 513, *Dean v. State*, 151 Ga. 371(1), 106 S.E. 792, 40 A.L.R. 1132; *Gullatt v. Collins*, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E. 825; *Rose Theatre Inc. v. Lilly*, 185 Ga. 53(1), 193 S.E. 866; *Atkinson v. Lam Amusement Co.*, 185 Ga. 379, 195 S.E. 156; *Forehand v. Moody*, 200 Ga. 166, 36 S.E.2d 321; *Norris v. Willingham*, 204 Ga. 441, 50 S.E.2d 22; *Thornton v. Forehand*, 211 Ga. 658, 87 S.E.2d 865; *Lee v. Hayes*, 215 Ga. 330, 331, 110 S.E.2d 624.

"The exhibition of an obscene motion picture is a crime involving the welfare of the public at large, since it is contrary to the standards of decency and propriety of the community as a whole. The welfare of the whole community is served by restraining the showing of such an obscene film.

"The court of equity was authorized to enjoin the exhibition of this obscene motion picture to the public." (Our emphasis)



excretion, that the same was utterly and absolutely without any redeeming social value whatsoever, and transgressed beyond the customary limits of candor in describing and discussing sexual matters (A 19, A 38).

Both complaints requested that a Rule Nisi issue, requiring the defendants to show cause why such motion picture films should not be declared obscene. On that date, an ex parte order issued out of that Court temporarily restraining and enjoining the defendants "from concealing, destroying, altering or removing the . . . (films) . . . without the jurisdiction of this Court." and ordering the defendants to appear on January 13, 1971, at 2:00 P.M. with the films as they were exhibited to the general public on the 28th day of December, 1970, together with the proper equipment for exhibiting and viewing the same (A 22, 41) and show cause why such orders should not issue.

The films were produced in Court by the defendants on January 13, 1971, after Joe Bellew, the manager of both theatres had been held in contempt for refusing to furnish the same on grounds of self-incrimination<sup>7</sup> (A 48). At that

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<sup>7</sup>In addressing itself to this problem, the Arizona Supreme Court in *Anderson v. Coulter*, 499 P.2d 103 (June 29, 1972) recently held as follows:

"We believe that reliance upon the Fifth Amendment to prevent the production of a film that has been previously exhibited to the public is misplaced. *Having the protection of the First Amendment and asserting it as the defendant does here, it seems to us both illogical and irrational to say, particularly where the item has been exhibited to the public, that the defendant may then rely upon the privilege against self-incrimination to refuse to produce the film at the prior adversary hearing.*

"We agree with Justice Traynor concerning the extent of the testimonial privilege: '\* \* \* When the prosecution has ample evidence of the existence, identity, and authenticity of documents in the defendant's possession and thus does not need to rely on his knowledge to locate and to identify them or on his testimony to authenticate them, it may be that his implied admission alone that the documents produced were those he

time, the parties stipulated and agreed to waive a jury trial and a preliminary hearing, in order that the judgment and order entered by the trial judge would be a final order and judgment in each case (A 89). It was also stipulated that three photographs (copies, Appendix F, p. 4) could be received in evidence as correctly portraying the outside of the Paris Adult Theatre I and Paris Adult Theatre II as they existed on December 28, 1970.

## B. THE TRIAL

The two films, "It All Comes Out In The End" and "Magic Mirror" were exhibited to the Court (A 50). Time-Motion Studies of the subject matter appearing in those films appear hereinafter at pages 11 to 63, for this Court's examination.<sup>2</sup>

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was ordered to produce would involve too trivial a degree of incrimination to justify invoking the privilege. (See Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, pp.22-23; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.Chi.L.Rev. 687, 699-701.) \* \* \* Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 58 Cal.2d 56, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 921, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1952).

"In this case, the prosecution's 'ample evidence' of the 'existence, identity, and authenticity' of the movie was expressly shown in the subpoena duces tecum. It is obvious that the prosecution had everything it needed to identify the film and compliance with the subpoena duces tecum did no more than produce the film already known by both the prosecution and the court to exist.

"We believe that a person who exhibits to the public an allegedly obscene film has, by that showing, waived his right to claim his privilege against self-incrimination when subpoenaed to produce the film at the prior adversary hearing, provided the prosecution has properly identified the film to be produced." (Our emphasis)

<sup>2</sup>A time-motion study is a chronological series of still photographs of a motion picture film, timed in their relative order of appearance, which, by "stopping" the movement appearing on the motion picture screen and recording the same, permits the type of conduct being portrayed thereon to be analyzed in a fair and accurate manner. Compare in this regard, the photographic representations of "It All Comes Out In The End" and "Magic Mirror" with the verbal descriptions of the same in Judge Jack Etheridge's opinion, appearing at page 74.

TIME-MOTION STUDY OF

"MAGIC MIRROR

Exhibited at  
Paris Adult Theatre,  
Atlanta, Georgia

Dec. 28, 1970

MAGIC MIRROR

(Part 1 of 15 Parts)





"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 1 of 15 Parts)

Credits 1-2; Female 1 browsing in antique store, purchases mirror 3-34; female 1 in her Apt. 35-38; TV man arrives to do repair 39-55; female 1 enters her bedroom for mirror and glance at mirror 56-58; fade to scene. female 1 & TV man.

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(part 2 of 15 parts)



"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 2 of 15 Parts)

Female 1 & TV man lather each other, genitals and breasts 73-111; they fall to floor and engage in sexual intercourse, female on top 113-136; female slides back and forth over his body 137-144



"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 3 of 15 Parts)



"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 3 of 15 Parts)

Female continues to slide over male 144-170; sexual intercourse, woman on top  
172-194; sexual intercourse, male on top 196-216

"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 4 of 15 parts)

-18-



"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 4 of 15 Parts)

Sexual intercourse, male on top 217-254; they grapple and roll over each other 254-276; sexual intercourse, woman on top 277-288.

(Part 5 of 15 Parts)



"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 5 of 15 Parts)

Sexual intercourse, woman on top 289-293; sexual intercourse, man on top 295-301; simultaneous fellatio and cunnilingus 301-319; fadeout to 322; female 1 pays TV man 322-329; female reading as doorbell rings, female 2 and female 30

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 6 of 15 Parts)








"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 6 of 15 Parts)

Fade to both girls nude 360-364; lesbian activity 364-382; female on top, rubbing genitals 383-399; lesbian activity 400-408; cunnilingus 409-415; females fondle each other's breasts 416-432.

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 7 of 15 parts)



"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 7 of 15 Parts)

Focus on anus 433-440; cunnilingus 441-453; simultaneous cunnilingus 454-493;  
reverse positions in cunnilingus 494-504.

(Part 8 of 15 Parts)





"MAGIC MIRROR"  
(Part 8 of 15 Parts)

Cunnilingus 505-512; rubbing of genitals 512-527; cunnilingus and auto-eroticism 527-558; lesbian activity 558-576.

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 9 of 15 Parts)





"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 9 of 15 Parts)

Lesbian activity 577-583; rubbing of genitals 584-636; fadeout as girls leave 641; scene shifts to bedroom, female, and man in full dress are dancing 641-648.



"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 10 of 15 Parts)



"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 10 of 15 parts)

Female 1 and man dance 649-659; both look at mirror - fadeout to two nude males and two nude females dancing 661-678; cunnilingus 678; fellatio 680-682; sexual embrace 682-690; cunnilingus 691-701; sexual intercourse, woman or top, 702-707; sexual activity 708-720.

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 11 of 15 parts)





"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 11 of 15 Parts)

Cunnilingus 723; sexual intercourse 724-731; cunnilingus 733; sexual intercourse male on top 737-750; sexual intercourse, woman on top 751-756; group orgy 756-792

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 12 of 15 Parts)



"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 12 of 15 Parts)

Sexual intercourse, male on top 793; 824-833; sexual intercourse, woman on top 834; group orgy 834-856; fade to apartment 856-858; couple leave in formal attire 858-861; scene shifts to female 1 asleep in bed 862-864.

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 13 of 15 Parts)







"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 13 of 15 Parts)

Burglar enters and rifles her purse 865-869; female awakes and burglar using gun forces her to lie down as he binds her hands 872-880; policeman enters and holds gun on burglar 881-892; fade to robber and policeman nude, fondling female 1

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 14 of 15 Parts)





"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 14 of 15 Parts)

Sexual intercourse between female 1 and burglar 932-940; female on top 940-943; cunnilingus 944; sexual intercourse, woman on bottom 948-956; sexual intercourse woman on top 958-965; sexual intercourse, lying on top of unconscious policeman 980-984; officer awakens 984-987; group orgy 987-1008.

"MAGIC MIRROR"

(part 15 of 15 parts)





"MAGIC MIRROR"

(Part 15 of 15 Parts)

Group sexual intercourse 1009-1032; sexual intercourse, woman on top 1049; female performs fellatio on each; policeman licks her toes 1064; scene changes back to room; police officer shoots burglar who falls to floor 1064; policeman leaves to make report; female reads note.

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TIME-MOTION STUDY OF

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

Exhibited at  
Paris Adult Theatre,  
Atlanta, Georgia

Dec. 28, 1970



(Part 1 of 10 parts)





"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 1 of 10 Parts)

Credits 1-15; Females 1 and 2 in lesbian activity 16-21; males 1 and 2 riding in auto 22; lesbian activity 23-26; males in auto 27-31; lesbian activity 32-35; males in auto 36-38; cunnilingus 39-49; double cunnilingus 50-66; males in auto 67-69.

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

(Part 3 of 10 parts)



"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 3 of 10 Parts)

Females 1 and 2 at dock area 145-157; two males arrive and go in opposite direction 158-176; female 1 invites male 1 to her apartment for coffee 177-193; female 2 (blonde) arrives with male 2 (companion of male 1) 194-209; female 2 in kitchen talks to male 2. They embrace 210-216.

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

(Part 4 of 10 Parts)



"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 4 of 10 Parts)

Female 2 and male 2 embrace in kitchen 217-219; male 1 talks to female 1 and are joined by other couple 220-224; male 2 and female 1 (brunette) go into bedroom; male 2 forcibly undresses and engages female 1 in intercourse and cunnilingus 228-261; female 2 in living room does strip tease for male 1 262-275; in bedroom, male 2 and female 1 engage in cunnilingus and fellatio 276-288.

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

(Part 5 of 10 Parts)



"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 5 of 10 Parts)

Female 2 undresses male 1 in living room 290-296; female 1 and male 2 in sexual intercourse in bedroom 297-302; female 2 mounts male 1 in living room 303-314; sexual intercourse in bedroom, male on top 315-331; female 2 undresses male in living room and starts fellatio 332-340; sexual intercourse in bedroom, male on top 341-360.

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

(Part 6 of 10 Parts)





"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 6 of 10 Parts)

Female 2 performs fellatio on male 1 in living room, who has climax. 361-432.

(Part 7 of 10 Parts)

11. ALL COMES OUT IN THE END





"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 7 of 10 Parts)

Sexual intercourse in bedroom, male on top 433-453; in bedroom, male 2 forces female to perform fellatio 454-483; sexual intercourse in bedroom, male on top 484-504. Sexual climax.

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

(Part 8 of 10 Parts)





"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 8 of 10 Parts)

Sexual intercourse in bedroom, male 2 on top 505-523; male 2 exist bedroom and female 2 enters bedroom 524-531; males 1 and 2 reach homosexual understanding in living room 532-550; females 1 and 2 engage in lesbian acts in bedroom 551-559; males 1 and 2 enter bedroom 560-565; males 1 and 2 engage females 1 and 2 in sex orgy 566-576.

"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"

(Part 10 of 10 Parts)





"IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END"  
(Part 10 of 10 Parts)

Sexual intercourse, male on top 649-667.

**THE END**

The two investigators from the Solicitor's office identified the same as being the films which they had seen exhibited at the Paris Adult Theatre I and Paris Adult Theatre II on December 28, 1970. The defense offered a witness, Robert Morris Dowd, Assistant Professor of Maternal and Child Health and Family Health and Population Dynamics at the School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine at Tulane University, who testified that the predominant appeal of the film was not to a prurient interest in sex and that the films were of value to society.

### 1. Plaintiff's Case in Chief

On direct examination by Mr. Moran, Ira W. Brown, an investigator in the Solicitor's office testified as to the circumstances surrounding his viewing of the film. He stated that on December 28, 1970, he had occasion to view the film, "All Comes Out In The End" in its entirety at the Paris Adult Theatre, 320 Peachtree Street, Fulton County, Georgia where he gained admission by paying an admittance fee of \$3.00; that he had seen the film which had been exhibited to the Court and that, to the best of his knowledge,<sup>9</sup> the film

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<sup>9</sup>The disadvantage flowing from Ira Brown's failure to take possession of the instrumentality of the crime on December 28, 1970, is apparent. With a lapse of two weeks between the two viewings, the "faulty judgment resulting from disability in one or more of the senses, *Breithaupt v. Abram*, 352 U.S. 432, 439, 16 L.Ed.2d 448, 453, 77 S. Ct. 409 (Feb. 25, 1957), had time to take hold and the most reliable testimonial evidence that he could give was that "to the best of my knowledge" the films were the same. It is a well-documented fact that sexually oriented motion picture films are often altered by deleting erotic scenes. The effective administration of justice requires that an exact copy of the contents of the film, as shown at the time of the alleged offense, be preserved for trial. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Charles H. Keating, Jr. in Support of Respondent in *Roaden v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, No. 71-1134, Point I B 1, at pages 69-85, "Legitimate Interests of Society Require That The Autoptical Evidence Used To Project The Audio Sound And Visual Images On The Screen Be Preserved Against Alteration or Destruction."

had seen exhibited in the courtroom was the same film he had seen at the Paris Art Theatre on December 28, 1950, (A 50-51).

In cross-examination by defense counsel Smith, Brown testified that there were no advertising pictures on the outside of the theatre to draw his attention to the contents of either of the two films. (A 51)

In questioning by the Court he answered that he believed there was a sign outside advising of the title of the film, "It Comes Out In The End" and that he knew the title of the film as he went in, but that he believed the question asked was as to any pictures, and he was assuming the question was as to pictures of what was showing inside (A 52).

In re-examination by Mr. Moran, he testified that he did not remember if the title of the picture was exhibited outside the door, or the marquee of the building; that there were many people in the theatre when he was there; that there was nothing exhibited on the outside of the theatre which would indicate acts of fellatio, or acts of cunnilingus, or acts of intercourse in multiple groups would be shown.

In re-cross-examination by defense counsel Smith, Brown testified that he had seen movies in the City of Atlanta where there was depiction of cunnilingual activity and fellatio were clearly depicted. Asked, "Were there any such depiction clearly depicted in this movie?" he answered, "Not clearly." Asked if he in fact, saw any film that showed an act of intercourse, he answered, "The film I would say spoke for itself. If you say penetration, no." (A 53)

In re-direct examination by Mr. Moran, he stated that he had seen in the film a nude male between the legs of a female, with motions, and saw the head and face of a female with her head in the pubic region of a nude

male.

On re-examination by the Court he was asked, "You answered Mr. Moran's questions but I want to be sure your having seen that. Would you state or could you state whether those acts were simulated acts or actual acts of cunnilingual activity and fellatio,"<sup>10</sup> to which Brown replied, "If you were in the room, you would see as much you see on the film if you were standing in the room." (A 54)

On re-cross-examination by defense counsel Smith, Brown re-stated that he had seen films in Atlanta in which the acts were clearly depicted, including penetration, and while the Paris Adult Theatre film, did not show penetration, there was no difference between the movies. Asked the question "So when you answered the Judge's question, it was your imagination that you were utilizing as to what was being depicted on the screen, isn't that true?" he answered, "I wouldn't say that was my imagination." and that he saw cunnilingual activity and fellatio, or what he thought of those things (A 55).

C. R. Little, an investigator in the Solicitor's office testified on direct examination as to the circumstances surrounding his viewing of the film. He stated that on December 28, 1970, he had occasion to see the film, "Magic Mirror" in its entirety at the Paris Art Theatre at 320 Peach Street, Fulton County, Georgia, where he gained admission.

<sup>10</sup>When Superior Court Judge Jack Etheridge asked this question of the witness, he himself has already seen both films in their entirety. (A 50) In view of the nature of the context of the film, "It All Comes Out In The End," (see time-motion studies pages 10 to 11, supra) it is difficult for amicus to understand the significance of such a line of questioning. Perhaps Judge Etheridge was misled by the 8 millimeter film which defense counsel proffered to the Court as "illustrations and not as evidence" of films which were held not to be obscene. (A 54)

by purchasing a ticket for \$3.00; that he had seen the film which had been exhibited in the courtroom and that it was the same movie he had witnessed on December 28, 1970. (A 56) He stated he purchased the ticket from Cliff Terry, the clerk on duty, who told him that Fred Pritchard was the projectionist on duty. He stated that he knew Joe Bellew to be the manager of the theatre, but that Bellew was not there when he purchased the ticket; he stated that there was nothing on the outside of the theatre to warn a person what the contents of the film would be, other than that adult movies were being shown inside and that no one under 21 years of age would be admitted. (A 57)

The Court sustained the defense counsel's objection to the question regarding his opinion as to whether or not the film, "Magic Mirror" had any redeeming social value on the grounds that he had not been qualified as an expert. (A 58)

On cross-examination by defense counsel Smith, he was asked if there was a theatre in town which had signs outside that said acts of fellatio and intercourse were depicted inside to which he replied, "Yes, Flick 16 on Houston Street in Atlanta." (A 59) He stated that he saw acts of intercourse, fellatio and cunnilingus in the "Magic Mirror"; that he didn't see actual penetration of the penis, but had in other films; that he didn't actually see the woman putting her mouth on the man's penis; that he saw a man put his tongue in the area of the vagina, and that in one scene there was actual touching of the vagina of two women, and the feeling and fondling of the breasts, and the body of one another, movement, and heavy breathing; that coupled with the motions, the sound effects, and breathing, and so forth, there was no question but what acts of fellatio, cunnilingus and intercourse were being performed. (A 60)



He stated that he had at one time on another occasion seen an Indian shot from his horse in a movie and didn't think he got shot by the arrow. Asked, "That was simulated death, wasn't it?", he replied, "I suppose it was, yes sir." Asked if the Indian grunted and groaned and acted like he was dying, he answered, "Well, they go through the motions, yes sir." (A 62)

On re-direct examination by Mr. Moran, he stated that there was no doubt in his mind when he saw a naked man with his head between the legs of a naked woman and his face in her pubic area that an act of cunnilingus was being performed, and that if he should walk into a room and see a nude woman with her legs spread apart and a nude man on

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"A clear example of the application of a non sequitur. There is no law which prohibits the pictorial portrayal of simulated murder, whereas there is an almost universally recognized law which prohibits the pictorial portrayal of indecent public conduct and that is the law against "lewdness" in public displays. By far the best legal opinion on this point of law was written by Judge Burke, speaking for the majority of the New York Court of Appeals in *Trans-Lux Dist. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents*, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861, (Mar. 26, 1964) reversed on other grounds in *Trans-Lux Dist. Corp. v. Bd of Regents* 380 U.S. 259, 13 L.Ed.2, 959, 85 S. Ct. 952.

"This comparison between the acknowledged competence of the State to forbid public or semi-public sex displays and its power to exert similar control over similar conduct depicted on the screen is not intended to imply any broad theory of legal equivalence between real conduct and filmed imitation. Indeed, the meaningful comparison exists only in a narrow range of cases. In most instances, the real conduct is illegal because of what is accomplished by the person, as in murder, forgery, or adultery. In such cases, the filmed dramatization obviously does not share the evil aimed at in the law applicable to the real thing. Where, however, the real conduct is illegal, not because of what is accomplished by those involved, but simply because what is done is shocking, offensive to see, and generally believed destructive of the general level of morality, then a filmed simulation fully shares, it seems to me, the evil of the original. In such cases the free expression protection of the First Amendment must apply to both or neither. It makes no sense at all to say that the conduct can be forbidden but not the play or film.

top of her going up and down and making upward and downward movements with her head and him making remarks for her to take it all, that was an act of fellatio. (A 63)

## 2. The Defense

Robert Morris Dowd was offered by the defense as a witness to testify on "prurient appeal" and "social value." (A 69) He stated that his present address was 6061 Parish Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, and that he was presently Assistant Professor of Maternity and Child Health and Family Health and Population Dynamics at the school of Public Health and Tropical Medicine at Tulane University; (A 65) that he was Vice-President of the Louisiana Mental Health Planning Council, a member of the Louisiana Mental Health Association, a member of the Louisiana Psychiatric Association and until recently, a member of the Juvenile Delinquency Committee of the Louisiana State Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice; that during the past three years he had served as Director of Family Life and Sex Education of Orleans Parish in the public school system and also served as an adjunct to the Assistant Professor of Maternity and Child Health and a clinical Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology. (A 66)

He stated that he had a Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy from the University of Buffalo, a Master of Education degree from the University of Buffalo, and a Master of Arts degree from the same university; that he had a doctorate in education degree from the State University of New York at

Buffalo and a Master of Public Health degree in family health and population dynamics from Tulane University, School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine. (A 67)

Dowd stated that until July 1st he was a full-time member of Mr. Robert East's group practicing in Tulane University in the Department of Psychiatry and as a member of that group did mainly marital therapy and taught human sexuality and marital therapy to medical students and psychiatric residents; that in those matters he dealt with matters relating to nudity; that in the family planning unit in Tulane he was looking at the psychiatric aspects of family planning including human sexuality (A 67); that he maintained a marital therapy practice and took a limited number of patients referred to him by either psychiatrists or obstetricians in the New Orleans area. (A 68)

He stated that he had seen both, "It All Comes Out In The End" and "Magic Mirror." (A 69) Asked if those films had an appeal to the average adult's prurient interest in sex, he stated it was his opinion that they would not. (A 70) Asked why? He stated, "I just simply don't believe that the average normal American adult has a prurient in sex. I think that if the average American adult walked into one of these theaters and sees a movie such as this, that he is exhibiting a normal healthy sexual interest rather than a prurient or morbid or sick interest." (A 70)

Asked if those movies had any values to society, he answered, "Yes." Asked his opinion as to those values, he stated that many normal healthy American adults have a great curiosity about other forms of sexuality, (A 70) that they have fears about their own human sexuality and to go to a movie like this would help eliminate some of those fears; that a person who was normal and healthy who had fears that he might be a homosexual might go into a movie



such as this and see that depiction of the homosexual and say, "My God, I am not like that," or he might say, "I'm like that" and go seek help. So the movie might get him to come to a professional and to seek help. Also women have fears about their breasts being a normal size or abnormal size, do they have more pubic hair or less than others, and and so do males. Of course, the last movie wouldn't have helped any . . . ." He further stated that these kind of movies in general helped to eliminate fears and helped to satisfy curiosity about sexual matters. (A 71)

He quoted statistics from the Presidential Commission regarding the percentage of men and women who voluntarily expose themselves to this kind of material and concluded his testimony with the statement that, "I'm seeing more and more of the couples going to these theaters, married couples, and so forth. I think personally these movies appeal to the normal American adult, and I don't think it is a prurient interest, I think it is a healthy interest in sex." (A 71, 72)

On cross-examination by Mr. Moran he stated that he didn't see any activities in the movies that were beyond the normal range of human sexual activity as he knew it to be from dealing in this area with a great many patients and with a great many people at large; (A 72) that his opinions came from surveys made by himself on sexual attitudes; that he had seen only half of the film, "Magic Mirror" and had never testified in a film case before, (A 73) but had in two other cases involving obscenity; one in Federal Court in New Orleans and the other in Memphis; that Mr. Jack Peebles in New Orleans retained him in the former case which was still unresolved and that Mr. Smith retained him in the later case where the material was found to be not obscene. (A 74)

Asked if sex films had a therapeutic value, he stated,

yes, for that portion of the community that would like to see this kind of material or had curiosity about it. Asked if such a film would stimulate an interest or curiosity in sex, he answered, "I would hope that the normal healthy American male or female would be sexually stimulated by sexual material." (A 74) Asked for what purpose the sex film was made, he stated, "The only value I can see in this kind of film would be perhaps some educational value for persons who are curious about this kind of thing and perhaps some amusement value." (A 75)

Asked if sexual activity in his judgment would have to either have one, an erect penis, or two, a worldly view of the insertion for intercourse to be taking place before he would determine it was sexual intercourse, he answered, "Yes, sir." (A 77)

Asked if the orgy scenes would contribute to the welfare of the community, he stated, "It depends upon your moral judgments about some other things. For instance, if a couple was curious about wife swapping, or something like this and they could substitute some fantasy by seeing a film such as this rather than the actual thing, I think it might be good for the community. (A 78) Asked whether such a scene could encourage someone who had not considered wife swapping to experiment in this field, he said, "No, I don't believe so," and stated that they serve as a fantasy substitute more than they do to encourage activity and that "the life of the action of these movies and books is around four hours, that they don't stimulate (psychologically) much beyond four hours." (A 78)

Asked for what purpose these films were produced, he answered, "For entertainment, to try to draw in a crowd, to fill the theater up." (A 79) Asked if a nude female in the act of fellatio would be entertainment, he answered, "Look-

ing at this kind of material has provided entertainment for a great many hundreds of years in one form or another. (A 80) Asked if the films provided entertainment or supplied a morbid curiosity in sex, he answered that the person who goes inside to make trouble rather than to be entertained is morbid. He stated that the films did not contribute anything to his welfare, "and it didn't stimulate me either as far as that goes." He stated he would not pay \$3.00 to see either one of these films. (A 81)

On redirect examination by defense counsel Smith, Dowd stated that he had first been called to testify in the case on Monday morning and that at that time he was advised as to what the films contained. (A 81) He also stated that he had come to the trial with the understanding that if, after seeing the films, he had a different opinion or the films were other than as were described to him, he would not testify. (A 82)

On questioning by the Court he was asked the significance of the scene in "Magic Mirror" at the end where a young man was shot by a police officer and there was this dramatic gushing of blood as he is killed, "there was no emotion shown on the part of the girl as to the death and all the rest of the rather blase approach towards it, what relationship does that have, . . . does that exacerbate sex feelings or what, what does it do?" (A 82) He answered, "By violence, not only in any film, but as far as I am concerned they don't need to do that kind of thing . . . what I really object to, a few weeks ago, four weeks ago or so there was a Life Magazine that comes into my home. . . . showing heads lopped off or who had committed Hari Kari just grizzly, gastly things that to me are obscene and should not be permitted to intrude in my home, and this I don't approve of even in these movies or in Life Magazine or anywhere

else. Apparently our society is filled with this and it does intrude on us." (A 83) Asked if he perceived that to be for the purpose of arousing greater reaction on the part of the viewer, (A 83) he stated, "I can't imagine that it would and therefore I can't imagine why they put it in. . . . This seems to be true of a lot of these sexually oriented magazines and things . . . . they will have a death at the end and I don't really know why." (A 83)

At the conclusion of Dowd's testimony the defense rested.

On April 12, 1971, Judge Etheridge filed his order holding both films not obscene and dismissing the actions. That order read, in part, as follows:

"The State contends that the motion pictures under review in the above actions are obscene. The titles of the films are 'It All Comes Out in the End' and 'Magic Mirror,'

"Assuming that obscenity is established by a finding that the actors cavorted about in the nude indiscriminately, then these films may fairly be considered obscene. Both films are clearly designated to entertain the spectator and perhaps, depending on the viewer, to appeal to his or her prurient interest. The portrayal of the sex act is undertaken; but the act itself is consistently only a simulated one if, indeed, the viewer can assume an act of intercourse or of fellatio is occurring from the machinations which are portrayed on the screen. Each of the films is childish, unimaginative, and altogether boring in its sameness.

"It appears to the Court that the display of these films in a commercial theater, when surrounded by requisite notice to the public of their nature and by rea-

sonable protection against the exposure of these films to minors, is constitutionally permissible.<sup>12</sup>

"IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT the films, even though they display the human body and the human personality in a most degrading fashion, are not obscene.

"The actions against the Defendants, therefore, are

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<sup>12</sup>When this Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari herein, its original order of June 26, 1972, read, in part, as follows: "The parties are requested to brief and argue in addition to those questions presented in the petition the following question: 'Whether the display of any sexually oriented films in a commercial theatre, when surrounded by notice to the public of their nature and by reasonable protection against exposure of the films to juveniles, is constitutionally permissible,'" (Our emphasis.) Through some unpublished subsequent order, the last two words of the original order (and the sense of the jurisdictional question) were changed to read "constitutionally protected." See *Paris Adult Theatre I et al v. Lewis R. Slaton et al.*, U.S. 33 L.Ed.2d 331, S. Ct. (June 26, 1971). Amicus thought the jurisdictional question, as originally phrased, to be more in point and would hope that this Court would come to grips with that issue in writing its opinion.

Judge Etheridge's order held that the exhibition of the films is constitutionally *permissible* and that the policy of the State of Georgia did not proscribe the same. In its opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court said that the judge was wrong, that the judicial policy of the State of Georgia *does* proscribe the same as a *matter of law* and, further, that the films are hard-core pornography. If a majority of this Court adopts the views of the late Justice Harlan re the role of the Federal Government in such matters and finds, as it surely must, that these films are hard-core pornography, then it must also find that the films are condemned as a matter of federal policy and federal law. See Point I A 1 at page 87. Under this view, the Oregon State Legislature might revoke its penal laws dealing with the subject of obscenity, but could not thereby create property rights in "hard-core pornography," so as to create a haven from which to carry on an interstate business which violated the federal statutes. Nor could the State Legislature deny to its citizens their "federal and civil rights" under our Judeo-Christian federal government, one of which is the right of the family to be free from the debasing influence of such materials in the communities. (See Portland, Ore. and Astoria, Ore. news articles on this problem at Appendix F, pages 5 to 6.) If *Roth* is correct, then such rights attach to citizenship in every civilized society. See Point I A 1 at page 87.



dismissed.

"This 12th day of April, 1971."

"On November 5, 1971, the Supreme Court of Georgia, after viewing the films, reversed the trial court decision by Superior Court Judge Etheridge. In its original opinion, dated Nov. 5, 1971, the Court in an unanimous decision, followed its three previous decisions which had affirmed temporary injunctions in three motion picture film cases: *Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton*, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S.E.2d 712 (Mar. 4, 1971); *Walter v. Slaton*, 227 Ga. 676, 182 S.E.2d 464 (May 13, 1971), and *1024 Peachtree v. Slaton*, 184 S.E.2d 144 (Oct. 7, 1971). In limiting its review to the "probable cause" issue, the Georgia Supreme Court held the trial court erred in dismissing the temporary injunction. In its original opinion, the Court said:

"As was pointed out in *Walter v. Slaton*, supra, the initial hearing in this kind of proceeding presents for the judge's decision only the question of whether there is probable cause to hold the material in question to be obscene, and therefore, whether the exhibition of a motion picture or the distribution of literature shall be temporarily enjoined until the ultimate question of obscenity can be passed upon by a jury. Therefore, 'on the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, the presiding judge should not undertake to to finally adjudicate issues of fact, but should pass on such questions only so far as to determine whether the evidence authorizes the grant or refusal of the interlocutory relief . . . .'"

This original opinion, a copy of which appears hereinafter at Appendix A-1 through A-9, overlooked a stipulation in the record by the attorneys which waived a jury trial and

provided for a final judgment to be rendered by the trial court judge.<sup>13</sup> See Statement of Facts, at page 10 supra. Upon the filing of petitions for a rehearing by both parties calling this matter to the Court's attention (A 7, 9), the Georgia Supreme Court on November 18, 1971, corrected the matter by nunc pro tunc order and filed a substitute opinion. At the same time it also denied both petitions for a rehearing. The final decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, as reported in 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768 (Nov. 5, 1971) overruled the finding of the trial judge and held both films to be hard-core pornography and obscene as a matter of law.

## SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

### I

Somehow, the moral climate in these United States has changed during the past 15 years - a deterioration of major proportions has taken place. Relying upon the value of one picture, as compared to one thousand words, an attempt has been made to rivet this Court's attention on reality by following Solicitor-General Rankin's argumentation in *Roth-Alberts*. Attached to this brief at Appendices, C, D, and E

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<sup>13</sup> It is important that this Court focus its attention on the entire Georgia procedure. There is an intense need throughout this Nation for a solid procedural precedent upon which other states might rely in moving in the courtroom against the deluge of obscenity. Under the Georgia procedure, upon a finding of "probable cause" the trial court is required to issue a temporary injunction. Compare *Wisconsin v. I, A Woman - Part II* 191 NW2, 897, 901 (Nov. 30, 1971). This procedure provides law enforcement with a quick and effective remedy. At the same time, the rights of the defendant are safeguarded. If the defendant sincerely desires a quick, final adjudication as to the "obscenity" issue, he can consolidate the hearing on the temporary injunction with the hearing on the final injunction, as in the *Paris Adult Theatre* appeal herein.

are photographic representations by way of time-motion studies, of a cross-section of the motion picture fare currently playing in this Nation's capitol. Three of the films now playing in September-October 1972 are "Deep Throat," "School Girl" and "Sticky Situation."

Amicus believes, as Sociologist William Kephart has recently stated, that we are *not* living in an era of moral erosion. Erosion, by definition, is a slow, uneven process which is not visible. What we are witnessing, is an era of laceration, which is *highly visible*. It would appear that we are due for a change and the time to begin is *now*!

The motion picture films "It All Comes Out In The End" and "Magic Mirror" are obscene in the "international" sense - "hard-core pornography." As such they are *condemned* under our federal constitution. In its opinion in *Roth-Alberts*, this Court noted that it was the universal judgment of civilized nations that obscenity should be proscribed.

It is a "Judaео-Christian" culture which this Court is called upon to interpret. According to that "Judaео-Christian" base, each citizen has and enjoys a personal civil right to live in an area which is free of the debasing influence of public indecency.

During the past 15 years, a blanket of confusion has engulfed the motion picture production area. That industry's understanding of the public responsibility which it bears under this Nation's obscenity laws has been almost destroyed. Such confusion is due in no small part to the failure of this Court to enunciate a judicial philosophy which truly reflects the public mores which have governed this Nation since its founding. A casual reference to, and brief reflection on the moral laws of this Nation dealing with sexuality



shows that such public mores do *presently* exist and codify the "National standards" which this Court has been seeking to enunciate. Amicus has attached at Appendix B a state-by-state survey of those laws which deal with lewdness, indecent exposure, obscenity, prostitution, sodomy, adultery, fornication, incest and profanity.

This Court has on many occasions stressed community ethical values as the basis for constitutional adjudication and has repeatedly said that "In an unbroken series of cases extending over a long stretch of this Court's history, it has been accepted as a postulate that the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications." This Court has also said that the values of the culture can often be detected from the practices of the states. In reviewing the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling, this Court must examine the background of this Nation's well-established ethical values.

One just does not fornicate in public, be it actual or simulated - nor may he on the motion picture screen. Those "values" exist for the benefit of the family unit which is at the very core of government in our Judaeo-Christian culture.

The common standards of right and wrong, as embodied in the law, require that both films be found to be obscene and a matter of law. The Courts have always been willing to take judicial notice of facts of a common or general knowledge and facts which are uncontrovertible.

The performance of sexual intercourse in public, whether real or simulated, live or as part of a motion picture film is against public policy and obscene per se. Justice Douglas has finally been forced to the wall. Having agreed in *Roth-Alberts* that there is nothing in the constitution which prevents a state from proscribing conduct on the grounds of

good morals, and acknowledged that the First Amendment does not permit nudity in public places, adultery or other phases of sexual conduct, he must now tell us how this Court can prevent any State Court from "enjoining" such conduct on the screen. See here the time-motion studies for the films "Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out in The End" appearing at pages 11-83 of Amicus' brief. Since oral Sodomy is a crime against public morals, then there is no logical argument which can justify the filming of such conduct and displaying it on the public screen. The Supreme Court of Georgia has, in no uncertain terms, stated "If any semblance of civilization is retained in our country, the States must have standards of conduct permissible in public. There is little difference in the effect on the public between lewd conduct in public areas and lewd conduct explicitly performed on a motion picture screen for the viewing of the public."

Where obscenity per se exists, the Court can take judicial notice of that fact, and no further evidence on such issue is necessary. The test, as repeatedly voiced in the courtroom, for obscenity per se is; "whether reasonable men could not differ, and could come to but one conclusion, i.e. that the material or performance is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre."

The legal principle upon which the Georgia Court's decision is based, i.e., that the public nuisance approach can be applied to restrain obscenity, is fundamental to our law. Under the common law, obscenity, indecency and lewdness were a public nuisance and could be abated by injunction. Joyce in his text "Law of Nuisances" defines public nuisance as an act which offends public decency. In its previous decision in the *Evans Theater* case (which this court

refused to review) the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a prosecuting attorney had an inherent right to bring an action to enjoin a threatened public nuisance, and such right included the right to stop the exhibition of films which were contrary to the standards of decency of the community as a whole. Other state courts have similarly ruled.

It should be noted that the Georgia legislature has voiced a similar "intent." In Section 61-116 of the Georgia Code, the state legislature, in voiding all leases for structures used for prostitution, expanded the definition of "prostitution" "to include the offering or giving of the body for sexual intercourse, sexual perversion, obscenity, and/or lewdness for hire . . ."

In enjoining such conduct, the Georgia Supreme Court was not attempting to reach private morality — its aim was to control and regulate public morality, which affects the people as a whole. The great majority of people believe that the morals of "bad" people do, at least in the long run, threaten the security of the "good" people. Such moral beliefs, when not demonstrably erroneous, are a proper basis for legislation. The interest being protected, in such cases, is the right of family to shape the moral notions of their children, and the right of the general public not to be subjected to violent psychological affront.

On this latter point, this Court has recognized in *Mugler v. Kansas* that the power to determine what is offensive to public morality is lodged in the legislative branch of government, and not in this Court. This Court's rulings in *Redrup v. New York* and later cases citing *Redrup*, are a clear violation of the principle voiced in *Mugler v. Kansas*.

The indirect effects of obscenity were recognized by Justice Harlan in *Roth-Alberts* where he stated: "The State

can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of time the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral standards." The long range, indirect effects inference, acknowledged by Justice Harlan, was also recognized by a majority of this Court in *Ginsberg v. New York*.

In a civilized society "hypocrisy is the complement that vice pays to virtue." It matters not that, in our present morally weakened society, there are many members of our "adult" community who may personally find it difficult to maintain high principles. It is one thing to say that they have a right to lead an immoral life; it is another thing to say that they have a constitutional right to propagate that immorality in the community. This Court's decisions in *U.S. v. Reidel* and *U.S. v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs*, in differentiating *Stanley v. Georgia*, explained that difference. It is inconceivable to Amicus that *Reidel* and *Thirty-Seven Photographs* have not already decided the questions herein.

There is a justifiable ground for the regulation of obscenity in whatever form it might take, whether it be criminal prosecution, qui tam action, injunction, or by some or all of the remedies in combination. That choice is in the state courts and state legislatures.

The films "Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out in The End" are clearly obscene as a matter of law. See here, the time-motion studies at pp 11-83.

## ARGUMENT

### INTRODUCTION

When this Court, a little over 15 years ago, heard arguments on the obscenity issue in *Roth v. U.S.*, 354 U.S. 476, hard-core pornography was a rarely seen under-the-counter item. At that time, the Federal Government worked hard at keeping it under control. In the Government's brief in *Roth v. U.S.*, (at page 34) the Solicitor-General identified "hard core pornography" as one of three categories of materials which were caught in the net of the Federal Obscenity Statute, and estimated the same to encompass 90% of the total materials actually caught under the Federal Statute. To make sure that the individual members of this Court understood what was meant by that "underworld" term and that rarely seen item, the Solicitor-General, by letter to the Clerk of this Court, dated Apr. 19, 1957, sent numerous samples of actual hard-core pornography to the Court.

Somehow, the moral climate in these United States has changed during the past 15 years - a deterioration of major proportions has taken place which, in turn, has fed itself back into the system, and accelerated the rate of decline. Nowhere is this change more apparent than in the area of public morals (sexual). Amicus doubts that this modern phenomenon has escaped the attention of any member of this Court; yet, recognizing the tragic certitude of Pope's Quatrain on the "Monster Vice"<sup>14</sup> and relying upon the value of one picture when compared with the use of words, an attempt has been made herein to rivet this Court's attention on reality by following Solicitor-General Rankin's illus-

<sup>14</sup>See footnote 4, *supra*, at page 4.



trative argumentation noted above.<sup>15</sup> Attached to this brief, at Appendices C , D and E are photographic representations, by way of time-motion studies, of a cross-section of the motion picture fare currently playing in this Nation's capitol as this Court sits in judgment on the recent actions taken by the Supreme Court of Georgia in their attempt to bring under control the proliferation of hard-core pornography on the public motion picture screens in that State.

The three motion picture films, "School Girl," "Deep Throat" and "Sticky Situation," which appear as time-motion studies in the Appendix herein, are presently playing at the Trans-Lux (14th and H St., N.W.), the New Plaza (New York Ave. and 14th St., N.W.) and the Playhouse (15th and H St., N.W.) Theaters, located in the shadows of the White House and the buildings which house Congress, and just a stone's throw from the stately structure and regal splendor in which this Court sits.<sup>16</sup> Amicus would emphasize that such films are no longer the under-the-counter, items which this Court considered 15 years ago via the illustrative arguments used by Solicitor-General Rankin.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>See also Amicus' Motion To Affirm in the "Vixen" case, No. 71-599, at Appendix E, pp. 2-5, wherein a cross-section of the new "Hollywood" in California was examined for purpose of argument by means of a diagram of a 4½ square mile area in the center of Hollywood, and photographs showing 74 retail outlets therein, dealing in hard-core pornographic materials.

<sup>16</sup>If this Court does not recognize such illustrated argument as autoptical proof of a society which is turning to Sodom and Gomorrah, then proof on the score does not exist, either in fact or in theory, which will instruct the justices on that proposition.

<sup>17</sup>Amicus submits that the justices of this Court, in considering the nature of their individual responses herein, would do well to re-examine the moral arguments made by the Solicitor-General in his brief in *Roth v. U.S.*, *supra*. See Briefs of Counsel, appearing at 1 L.Ed.2d 2199-2203.

In the year 1972, they are openly advertised in the newspapers and favorably reviewed.<sup>18</sup> Nor is this situation local - those films are playing in cities around the Nation, both large and small, and without police opposition, which has been "throttled" by this Court.<sup>19</sup>

In a recent writing, published on Sept. 1, 1972, William Kephart, PhD, Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, made the following observations on the above state of affairs, which are adopted herein as Amicus, opening remarks in support of affirmance herein:

"It is sometimes said that we are living in an era of moral erosion, but this is obviously not so. Erosion, by definition, is a slow, uneven process, barely discernible to the human eye. From this perspective, our shoreline of morality is not eroding. It is *being lacerated*. (Emphasis his.)

"Rates of divorce, venereal disease, crime and delinquency, adultery, fornication, rape, illegitimacy, and drug addiction increase with a tempo that makes economic inflation look sluggish by comparison. And while, in a sociological sense, it is not possible to pinpoint the relationship between these accelerating social problems on the one hand, and the increase in

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<sup>18</sup> See the motion picture ad, appearing in the Washington Post, dated Sept. 25, 1972, at page B8, a copy of which appears at Appendix F, page 2, showing "School Girl," "Deep Throat" and "Sticky Situation" playing at the Trans-Lux, New Plaza and Playhouse Theaters. See also the motion picture reviews for those films in Daily and Weekly Variety and Box Office, copies of which appear at Appendix F, pp. 12 et seq.

<sup>19</sup> See the Los Angeles Times Movie Ads of Oct. 7 & Sept. 29, 1972, copies of which appear at Appendix F, pages 3 and 7, which announce that "School Girl" is now playing in its fourth month at the "Cinema Theatre" in Los Angeles.

obscenity and pornography on the other, this much seems certain: if there were no relationship, the coincidence would be one of the most remarkable in the social history of our country. (Emphasis his.)

"My own feeling is that obscenity and pornography are reflective of a permissive philosophy which - while it carries the familiar seal of the Warren Court and the automatic blessing of the intellectual community - goes against the mainstream of America.

"There are two bright spots in the kaleidoscope. (1) Moral laceration (which is highly visible) is easier to counteract than moral erosion (which is practically invisible over the short-term). For reasons best known to themselves, those who believe in a permissive philosophy have pushed the rest of us too far, too fast. A reaction, while certainly not inevitable, would seem to be the next stage in a logical sequence. (2) Self-evidently, our present laws dealing with morality do not reflect the will of the people. And as sociologists have been reminding us ever since Prohibition, laws mores are in vain.

"In the struggle between the 'moralists' and the immoralists, the latter have held the offensive for some time now. It would appear that we are due for a change. And as they say in the theater, Please to begin . . ."



I.

THE MOTION PICTURE FILMS "IT ALL COMES OUT THE END" AND "MAGIC MIRROR" ARE NOT PROTECTED EXPRESSION UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY ARE CONDEMNED BY IT.

A. The Motion Picture Films "It All Comes Out In The End" and "Magic Mirror" Are Obscene In The International Sense (Hard-Core Pornography) And As Such Are Condemned Under The Federal Constitution.

In its opinion in *Roth-Alberts*, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L. Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (June 24, 1957, this Court noted that it was the universal judgment of civilized nations that obscenity should be proscribed. See *Roth-Alberts* at p. 484:

"... implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956. . . ." (Our emphasis.)

If government is to have meaning, the laws must be interpreted according to the cultural base from which the law is drawn. According to that base "indecenty" does have a concrete value. This Court has not yet seen fit to overrule *Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) It is a "Judaeo-Christian" culture which this Court is called upon to interpret. If the laws of the land, according to that "Judaeo-Christian" base, uniformly proscribe public indecenty, then each citizen has and enjoys a per-

sonal right under that government to live in an area which is free of public indecency. Amicus submits that, for this Court to refuse to acknowledge and enforce that value is to fail to recognize civil rights in the citizenry accruing and existing under the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and the corresponding sections of the State Constitution - civil rights which are enforceable under the law, irrespective of whether or not criminal penalties are attached.

During the past 15 years, a blanket of confusion has engulfed the motion picture production area and all but destroyed that industry's understanding of the public responsibility which it bears under this Nation's obscenity laws. Such confusion<sup>20</sup> is due in no small part to the failure of this Court to enunciate a judicial philosophy which truly reflects the public mores which have governed this Nation since its founding. A casual reference to and brief reflection on the moral laws of this Nation dealing with sexuality, as codified by the state legislatures (see Appendix B pp. 1-16 is cogent proof that such public mores do presently exist and are well defined. See also, *City of Youngstown, Ohio v. DeLoreto*, 251 N.E.2d 291, 48 Ohio Op. 2d 393 at 400 (Sept. 10, 1969); *State of Ohio ex rel. Ewing v. Without A Stitch*, 57 Ohio Op. 2d 184 at 187 (July 9, 1971); and *State of Ohio*

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<sup>20</sup>The Court in *People v. Kirkpatrick*, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Oct. 28, 1970) had the following to say at page 42 on this general confusion as it related to the criminal law:

"There is perhaps no area of criminal law in such utter state of confusion and frustration as that visited upon the publication and dissemination of obscene material 'Confusion now hath made its masterpiece' (*Macbeth*, Act II).

"The confusion, in great measure, must be attributable to the incredible divergence of views of the men on the United States Supreme Court, to whom all look for guidance . . ."

*ex rel. Keating v. Vixen*, 272 N.E.2d 137 at 140, 27 Ohio St. 2d 278 (July 21, 1971).

1. THE COMMON STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG EMBODIED IN THE STATUTORY LAW OF THIS NATION AND THE STATE OF GEORGIA SHOULD BE APPLIED AS THE RULE OF LAW IN THIS CASE IN FINDING THE TWO FILMS TO BE OBSCENE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

It is the basic contention of Amicus that the eyes of this Court, in reviewing the Georgia Supreme Court ruling below, should be focused upon the concepts which support the statutes being applied by Respondents, that is the universal verity that lewdness and obscenity are public nuisances, which are abatable under the law, and the ethical values shared by this Nation, as a whole, as defined in the legislative halls and documented in state and federal statutes and city ordinances. A state-by-state survey of the Nation's laws dealing with lewdness, indecent exposure, obscenity, prostitution, sodomy, adultery, fornication, incest and profanity is attached as Appendix "B". Appellants submit that these laws define the national standards which everyone in the courtroom today is seeking to ascertain.<sup>21</sup> This Court has on many occasions stressed community ethical values as the basis for constitutional adjudication. *Adamson v. Calif.*, 332 U.S. 46, 91 L.Ed. 1908, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (Justice Frankfurter concurring opinion). *Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber*, 329 U.S. 459, 470, 91 L.Ed.422, 67 S.Ct. 374 (concurring opinion). In *Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown*, 354 U.S. 436, 1 L.Ed.2d 1489, 77 S.Ct. 1325, handed down on the same date as the *Roth-Alberts* decision, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (June 24, 1957), Justice

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<sup>21</sup>See footnote 12 at page 75.

Frankfurter, in speaking for the majority of that Court in a case closely paralleling the matter herein, said, at page 1473:

"In an unbroken series of cases extending over a long stretch of this Court's history, it has been accepted as postulate that 'the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.' *Id.* 283 U.S. at 716." (Our emphasis.)

In *Solesbee v. Balkcom* (1950), 339 U.S. 9, 16, 27, 94 L.Ed. 604, 70 S.Ct. 457, Reh. Den. 339 U.S. 926, 94 L.Ed. 1348, 70 S.Ct. 618, Justice Frankfurter wrote that due process

"embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are, the less likely they are to be explicitly stated. But respect for them is of the very essence of the Due Process Clause. In enforcing them this Court does not translate personal views into constitutional limitations. In applying such a large untechnical concept as 'due process,' the Court enforces those permanent and pervasive feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions."

The values of the culture, Justice Frankfurter added, can often be detected from the practices in the states. He illustrated the point in this fashion: "The manner in which the states have dealt with this problem furnishes a fair reflection, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, of the underlying feelings of our society about the treatment of persons

who become insane while under sentence of death."

In reviewing the ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court which abated both films as a *matter of law*, this Court should judicially recognize that it was in the background of this Nation's well-established and shared ethical values that the producers of those films opted to move into the motion picture entertainment field and capitalize commercially via sensationalism, upon the natural abhorrence of civilized government to public displays of explicit sexual conduct. *One just does not fornicate in public, be it actual or simulated* -- nor may he on the public screen. (See Judge Burke's opinion, *infra* at page 93 .) The relevant historical facts under consideration certainly encompass this Nation's ethical values, as reflected in the well-knit pattern of city, state and federal laws relating to public sexual conduct (such as laws dealing with nudity, fornication, prostitution, indecent exposure, sodomy, solicitation of unnatural sex act, etc.) Those values exist for the benefit of the family unit which is at the very core of government in our Judaeo-Christian culture and are deserving of this Court's strong support.

The common standards of right and wrong embodied in the statutory law of Georgia should be applied as the rule of law in this case in upholding the Georgia Supreme Court's finding that the films "It All Comes Out In The End" and "Magic Mirror" are **UNLAWFUL AS A MATTER OF LAW**. This was the view of the unanimous Ohio Court in *City of Youngstown v. De Loreto*, 251 N.E.2d 491 (September 10, 1969). In *De Loreto*, the court enumerated the state statutes and city ordinances which prohibited specific immoral conduct. From that the court deduced what the Moral Standards of Ohio People on Sex were. (See *De Loreto* at pages 500



and 501. See also *Ohio ex rel Ewing v. "Without A Stitch"*, 276 N.E.2d 655 at 659 (July 9, 1971) and *Ohio ex rel Keating v. "Vixen"*, 272 N.E.2d 137 at 141 (July 21, 1971).

It is the prerogative of this Court to take judicial notice of the laws of the State of Georgia relating to sexual morality and apply them in reviewing the issue of obscenity in this case.

The vast history of the Common Law and the statutes of the State of Georgia make clear those particular areas of public conduct which are so immoral, so contrary to the immemorial custom of propriety of the people, so opposite to the natural sense of conscience and justice of the people, so pervasively at odds with the community notions of right and wrong, so consistently maintained as illegal and contrary to Anglo-American public policy that their display and exhibition to the public, either live or recorded, is UNLAWFUL AS A MATTER OF LAW. Obscenity, public indecency, incest, lewdness, immoral exhibitions, sexual perversion, and sodomy et seq., all are enumerated acts the public portrayal of which a judge should recognize as being part of the Common Law specification of "obscenity." See Appendix B. - 4 "Georgia."

The courts have always been willing to take judicial notice of those facts and policies that are of general and incontrovertible knowledge. Such matters include those facts of a common or general knowledge that are well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain, and known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. (28 Am. Jur.2d Sec. 34) They also have included a recognition of the ordinary instincts, passions, emotions, and motives which universally, in a greater or lesser degree, influence the actions and conduct of mankind. (28 Am. Jur.2d Sec. 114)

In addition, judicial notice has been extended to matters of public and social welfare (29 Am.Jur.2d Sec. 143) and the customs and usages of man which are generally known or accepted to an extent sufficient to make them matters of common knowledge. (28 Am.Jr.2d Sec. 121)

2. THE PERFORMANCE OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE  
IN PUBLIC, WHETHER REAL OR SIMULATED,  
LIVE, OR AS PART OF A MOTION PICTURE FILM  
OR STAGE PLAY IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY  
AND AS SUCH IS OBSCENE PER SE:

By far the best legal opinion on this point of law is that of Judge Burke's speaking for the majority of the New York Court of Appeals in *Trans-Lux Dist. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents*, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Mar. 26, 1964), at page 857:

"While typically applicable to 'speech' and 'press' in the forms known to the framers, the guarantee of the First Amendment has been read to include anything that is asserted to be someone's way of saying something. The most familiar instances of this application are physical conduct and motion pictures (*Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098, *supra*). Cases involving conduct as a form of expression have been frequent in labor law and provide a useful illustration of the transition from a somewhat doctrinaire application of the First Amendment (see e.g., *Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093, *supra*) to a realization that, while conduct may be speech, it still remains conduct and does not cease to present its unique problems of

social control. It is now the law that even peaceful picketing may be forbidden where it violates State labor laws that are not themselves designed as restrictions on freedom of speech (Local Union No. 10, etc., *Plumbers Union v. Graham*, 345 U.S. 192, 72 S.Ct. 383, 97 L.Ed. 946). Conduct that is proscribed for valid public purposes is not immune merely because engaged in with a view to expression (*Giboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co.*, 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834). For example, in *People v. Stover*, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272, *supra*, app. dsmd. for want of a substantial Federal question, 375 U.S. 42, 84 S.Ct. 147, 11 L.Ed.2d 107, this court upheld an 'Aesthetic' ordinance prohibiting the display of soiled laundry on a clothesline in the defendants' front yard, despite the fact that the display was an expression of social protest.

"Films, by their nature, may lie on either side of the division between speech and conduct. The opinions of the Supreme Court reversing this court in the cases of advocacy of adultery and thematic sacrilege make that plain. But it also follows that if 'picketing may include conduct other than speech, conduct which can be made the subject of restrictive legislation' (*Giboney v. Empire Ice & Storage Co. supra*, 336, U.S. p. 501, 69 S.Ct. p. 690, 93 L.Ed. 834) then so may films. In this regard, it will be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet expressed its opinion in a case involving allegedly obscene behavior on the screen . . . ."

And at page 860:

"In *Kingsley Intern. Pictures Corp. v. Regents*, 360 U.S. 684, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 2 L.Ed.2d 1512, the opin-



ion of the court repeatedly distinguishes between the right to communicate any idea, however deviant from orthodoxy, and 'the manner of its portrayal' (360 U.S. p. 688, 79 S.Ct. p. 1365, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512). The 'freedom to advocate ideas' was protected, not any supposed right to behave lewdly in a public place. Even more to the point is the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Clark who wrote: 'I see no grounds for confusion, however, were a statute to ban "pornographic" films, or those that "portray acts of sexual immorality, perversion or lewdness." If New York's statute had been so construed by its highest court I believe it would have met the requirements of due process. Instead, it placed more emphasis on what the film teaches than on what it depicts. There is where the confusion enters.' 360 U.S. p. 702, 79 S.Ct. p. 1372, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512; emphasis in original).

"It is my view that a filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or simulated, is just as subject to State prohibition as similar conduct if engaged in on the street. I believe the nature of films is sufficiently different from books to justify the conclusion that the critical difference between advocacy and actual performance of the forbidden act is reached when simulated sexual intercourse is portrayed on the screen. I take it to be conceded that New York may constitutionally prohibit sexual intercourse in public. As Mr. Justice Douglas acknowledge, dissenting in *Roth v. U.S.* . . . in contrasting books with conduct: 'I assume there is nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress from using its power over the mails to proscribe conduct on the grounds of good morals. No one would

suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in public places, adultery, and other phases of sexual misconduct' (emphasis in text).

"This observation is equally pertinent, of course, whether the sexual exhibitionism is done spontaneously in the street or in theaters for money (e.g., Penal Law, Consol. Laws. c.40, §§ 43, 1140, 1140-a, 1140-b). There have been many cases dealing with what sort of behavior was covered by statutes against sexual exhibitionism and the like, but they were solely concerned with statutory interpretation, never, obviously, the First Amendment. (Miller v. People, 5 Barb. 203; People v. Burke, 243 App. Div. 83, 276 N.Y.S. 402, affd. 267 N.Y. 571, 196 N.E. 585; People v. Mitchell, 296 N.Y. 672, 70 N.E.2d 168; People v. Dash, 282 N.Y. 632, 25 N.E.2d 979.)

"This comparison between the acknowledged competence of the State to forbid public or semi-public sex displays and its power to exert similar control over similar conduct depicted on the screen is not intended to imply any broad theory of legal equivalence between real conduct and a filmed imitation. Indeed, the meaningful comparison exists only in a narrow range of cases. In most instances, the real conduct is illegal because of what is accomplished by the person, as in murder, forgery, or adultery. In such cases, the filmed dramatization obviously does not share the evil aimed at in the law applicable to the real thing. Where, however, the real conduct is illegal, not because of what is accomplished by those involved, but simply because what is done is shocking, offensive to see, and generally believed destructive of the general level of moral-

ity, then a filmed simulation fully shares, it seems to me, the evil of the original. In such cases, the free expression protection of the First Amendment must apply to both or neither. It makes no sense at all to say that the conduct can be forbidden but not the play or film.

"The pattern of statutory regulation in New York aims at offensive - more properly, obscene - displays of conduct whether in the street (Penal Law, §§ 43, 1140, 1140-b), on the street (Penal Law, § 1140-a; *People v. Vickers*, 259 App. Div. 841, 19 N.Y.S.2d 165 - lewd dance) or on the screen (Penal Law, §§ 1140-a, 1141; Education Law, § 122). These laws care not about the communication of ideas (see *Stromberg v. California*, 283 U.S. 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117); they are aimed at certain narrow sorts of conduct. It seems to me, therefore, that if the defendants in *People v. Stover*, *supra*, could constitutionally be prohibited from selecting the forbidden form of conduct as the vehicle for the communication of their protest, then this petitioner cannot choose acted-out sexual intercourse as the vehicle for its art (see, also, *People v. Vickers*, *supra*, where a performer was prohibited from choosing a certain sort of dance as her vehicle, and the 'nude gymnasium' prohibited by Penal Law, §§ 1140-b). Numerous other instances also suggest themselves..

"If we can accept the obvious - that sexual intercourse whether performed in the park or simulated on the stage or screen is in itself a form of conduct (in which the public have an interest), it is apparent that when this defendant chooses to use it as a vehicle for the expression of art it has 'brigaded' the communica-

tion (to the extent that it is 'communication') with conduct completely. In so doing the petitioner has subjected itself to such regulations as are appropriate to the conduct when engaged in for reasons having nothing to do with expression. There is otherwise no difference between advocacy and action. (Compare *Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 738, 84 L.Ed. 1093, with *Local Union No. 10, etc., Plumbers Union v. Graham*, 345 U.S. 192, 73 S.Ct. 535, 97 L.Ed. 946.) 'Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it' (Douglas, J., dissenting in *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476, 514, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1324, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498)."

Judge Burke's closing principle, stated at page 863 is a complete answer to the claims of petitioner that the "educational" and "entertainment" aspects, testified to by defense witness Dowd, constituted "value" and offered a meritorious defense. (See Dowd's testimony at pages 70 to 73 ).

"To all argument predicated on artistic merit as decisive of the constitutional question, it is sufficient answer to say that artists are not such favorites of the law that they may ply their craft in the teeth of a declared overriding public policy against pornographic displays. Since no other profession is privileged to bend public morals, public and law to its internal craft standards, then neither should producers of films."

A majority of the California Supreme Court appear to be in agreement with Justice Burke. See *Billie Dixon, Riachrd Bright and Michael McClure v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco*, 267 Cal. App.2d 875, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587 (Dec. 2, 1968). Hearing denied January 29, 1969.

(with Justices Peters, Tobriner and Mosk dissenting) involving the stage play "The Beard." Justice Devine, speaking for an unanimous court (Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4) said at page 589:

"There are several sexual acts which, although not criminal in themselves, as is oral copulation, doubtless would be deemed by many a trier of fact applying First Amendment standards to be obscene even when contained in a play or a dance or other performance with full First Amendment protection. It is entirely possible that the simulation of such acts, and of the act in 'The Beard,' would itself be an obscene act. The positions and motions of the performers, the duration of the act, the accompanying dialogue and all of the circumstances, taken together with the content of the entire work, may establish an imitation of an actual deed to be obscene.

The same principle was recently voiced by the Georgia Supreme Court in its decision in *Evans Theatre Corp. et al. v. Slayton (supra)* holding the motion picture film "I Am Curious (Yellow)" to be enjoinable as a public nuisance because of the sexual activity portrayed therein:

"The Criminal Code of Georgia makes penal a lewd performance in public, including an act of sexual intercourse and a lewd appearance in a state of nudity. Code Ann. § 26-2011 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1301). such acts are prohibited, not because of the injury inflicted on other individuals, as in the case of murder or robbery, but because the acts are offensive to the majority of the people. If any semblance of civilization is retained in our country, the States must have standards of conduct permissible in public. There is little difference in the effect on the public between lewd con-



duct in public areas and lewd conduct explicitly performed on a motion picture screen for the viewing of the public." (Our emphasis.)

3. WHERE OBSCENITY PER SE EXISTS THE COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SUCH FACT AND NO FURTHER EVIDENCE ON SUCH ISSUE IS NECESSARY.

In *Mitchum v. State of Florida*, 251 So.2d 298 (Aug. 12, 1971) the District Court of Appeal of Florida made the following comment as to the application of judicial notice to material which was uncontrovertibly obscene:

"Examination of appellants' argument under this point indicates that the real issue raised is the contention that the absence of testimonial evidence, separate and apart from the magazines themselves considered as exhibits, renders the order of the lower court prejudicially erroneous and therefore reversible.

"In support of the latter proposition, appellants rely heavily on Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in *Smith v. California*, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205, reflecting his view, not that of the court, that expert testimony is necessary to a finding of obscenity by a court. That view being found only in a concurring opinion is, of course, not binding upon us as precedent nor are the holdings in the obscenity cases from several of our sister states which require testimonial evidence as a predicate for a finding of obscenity necessarily binding on this court. We have read them, of course, and while they appear sound and scholarly, they simply do not reflect our view of the law relating to the subject matter. In essence, those

cases encroach upon the entire concept of judicial notice as approved by our courts as well as those of other jurisdictions. Long ago, it was held that in proper circumstances "judicial notice" is superior to evidence since it fulfills the object which evidence is designed to fulfill and makes evidence on the point established by judicial notice unnecessary. *Amos v. Moseley*, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So.619. It is designed as the cognizance of certain facts which judges and jurors may properly take and act upon without proof, because they already know them. *United States v. Hammers*, D.C., 241 F. 542. Courts are presumed to know what everyone knows, 13 Fla. Jur., Evidence § 14. Thus, the question resolves itself into whether the materials here involved are of such character as to establish circumstances whereunder the court may determine the obscenity question without evidence. (Emphasis ours.)

"We hold that the materials herein are 'hard-core pornography' and therefore within the rule announced in *United States v. Wild*, 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied 402 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. 1644, 29 L.Ed.2d 152, reh. den. 403 U.S. 940, 91 S.Ct. 2242, 29 L.Ed.2d 720. There the government introduced no evidence other than the materials themselves which was claimed to be error. In rejecting the contention, the Court of Appeal reviewed the pertinent cases and held as follows:\*\*\*.

"In a remarkably similar case in which a conviction under section 1461 was unanimously affirmed, Judge Prettyman wrote:

"Most of the difficulty which enshrouds the discussion of the law concerning obscenity and filth develops upon consideration of books and magazine



articles. Here arise problems of scierter, the meaning and effect of the whole, the value of the work to proper interests of the public, the contemporary community standards in similar matters, and other baffling problems under our precious right of free speech. Discussed in several opinions in *Smith v. California* (361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205). But we have no such problem in the case of bar. These are stark, unretouched photographs - no text, no possible avoidance of scierter, no suggested proper purpose, no conceivable community standard which would permit the indiscriminate dissemination of the material, no alleviating artistic overtones. These exhibits reflect a morbid interest in the nude, beyond any customary limit of candor. They are "utterly without redeeming social importance," \* \* \* \*

*"We think that photographs can be so obscene - it is conceivably possible that they be so obscene - that the fact is uncontrovertible. These photographs are such. United States v. Womack (Womack v. United States), 111 U.S. App. D.C. 8, 294 F.2d 204, 205-206 (footnote omitted), cert. denied 365 U.S. 859, 81 S.Ct. 826, 6 L.Ed.2d 822 (1961)."* (Emphasis ours.)

"See also, *Kahm v. United States*, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 369 U.S. 859, 82 S.Ct. 949, 8 L.Ed. 2d 18 (1962); *United States v. Davis*, 353 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 953, 86 S.Ct. 1567, 16 L.Ed.2d 549 (1966). Cf. *Manual Enterprises v. Day*, 370 U.S. 478, 489-490 and n. 13, 82 S.Ct. 1482, 8 L.Ed. 2d 639 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.) \* \* \* \*

"(5,6) The above views expressed by the court in Wild were adopted by this court in the informative opin-

ion of this court in *Collins v. State Beverage Department*, 239 So.2d 613 (Fla. App. 1970). It is clear then that the rule in this jurisdiction is that if the materials before the court are what is termed 'hard-core pornography' no testimonial evidence is necessary to support a finding of obscenity \* \* \* \*"

In *Morris v. U.S.*, 257 A.2d 341 (Dec. 2, 1969) the Court voiced the following test for material which was "obscene *per se*," i.e., obscene as a matter of law:

"Although the definition and elements of obscenity have been authoritatively stated in *Roth* and *Memoirs*, definition of the oft-used terms 'hard-core obscenity,' and 'obscenity *per se*' has been neglected by the Supreme Court. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has faced this problem before and has defined these terms in the following language: Hard-core pornography or obscenity *per se* is obscenity which 'focuses predominantly upon what is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizaare without any artistic or scientific purpose of justification.' There is no desire to portray (it) in pseudoscientific or 'arty' terms. It can be recognized by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex and to the human spirit. It goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor and deviates from society's standards of decency in the representation of the matters in which it deals. It has a patent absence of any redeeming social value; it speaks for itself and screams for all to hear that it is obscene. It is not designed to be a truthful description of the basic realities of life as the individual experiences them but its main purpose (is) to stimulate erotic response. . . . No proof, other than the viewing of it, is required to deter-

mine if it is, in fact, obscene.

"It is clear to this court that where obscenity per se is involved, the prosecution is not required to offer any evidence (beyond the material or performance itself) that it is pornographic or obscene or that it is below the national community standards. *Womack*, *supra*; *Hudson*, *supra*. In other words, if reasonable men could not differ and they could come to but one conclusion, i.e., that the material or performance is sexually morbid, grossly perverse, and bizarre, without any artistic or scientific purpose or justification, then the Government on its case-in-chief need not offer any evidence of national community standards." (Our emphasis.)

See also *Wilhoit v. U.S.*, 279 A.2d 505, cert. den. 30 L.Ed.2d 546 (Dec. 14, 1971) (Douglas would grant cert. and set the case for argument). *Mitchum v. State of Florida*, 251 S.2d 298 at 301 (Aug. 12, 1971); *U.S. v. Womack*, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 8, 294 F.2d 204, cert. den. 365 U.S. 859, 81 S.Ct. 826, 5 L.Ed.2d 822 (Mar. 27, 1969); *U.S. v. Wild*, 422 F.2d 34 (Oct. 29, 1969), cert. den. 402 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. 1644, 29 L.Ed.2d 152, rehrg. den. 403 U.S. 940, 91 S.Ct. 2242, 29 L.Ed.2d 720 (June 21, 1971); *Mitchum v. State of Florida*, 244 S.2d 159, 160 (Jan. 26, 1971); *Collins v. State Beverage Dept.*, 239 S.2d 613, 616; *Marks v. State of Florida*, 262 S.2d 479 (May 23, 1971); *Kaplan v. U.S.*, 277 A.2d 477 at 479 (May 10, 1971); *Illinois v. Ridens*, 282 N.E.2d 691 at 695 (Mar. 21, 1972); *State of Minn. v. Getman*, 195 N.W.2d 827 at 829 (Mar. 17, 1972); Justice Herndon dissenting in *Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions*, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576, 579 (Mar. 2, 1972); *United Theatres of Florida v. State ex rel Gerstein*, 259 S.2d 210, 212

(Feb. 15, 1972); *U. S. v. Miller*, 455 F.2d 899 at 902 (Mar. 22, 1972).

In *Boreta Enterprises, Inc., v. Dept. of Alcohol Beverage* 2 Cal. 385, 84 Cal. Rptr. 113 at 123 (Feb. 26, 1970), Justice Sullivan writing for a majority of the California Supreme Court, acknowledged that the conduct at issue could be so extreme as to properly conclude that the subject matter was "per se" contrary to public morals, at page 123:

"This, however, is not the focal point of our present inquiry. We here examine the power invested by the Constitution in the Department to revoke a specific alcoholic beverage license 'if it shall determine for good cause that the . . . continuance of such license would be contrary to public . . . morals . . . .' (Cal. Const. Art. XX, § 22, italics added; see fn. 4, *ante*.) This requires us to observe the distinction between the imperatives of the moral order and the mandates of the civil order. It is therefore the public morals, not the private morals of the officials or employees of the Department, however conscientious or well-intentioned, which must be the criteria in the instant case. In other words, in resolving the issue before us, our reference must be to the morals of the people, that is, to those of the community at large, of the whole body of the people. (See *Duskin v. State Board of Dry Cleaners* (1962), 58 Cal.2d 155, 163, 23 Cal. Rptr. 404, 373 P.2d 468; see definition of 'public,' Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951); Webster's Third New International Dict.) If by 'morals' we mean 'the moral practices of an individual, or culture; habits of life or modes of conduct' (Webster's *op. cit.*, see 'moral') we think the term 'public morals' must be taken to mean the moral prac-

tices or modes of conduct 'pertaining to a . . . whole community; . . . relating to . . . the whole body of people or an entire community.' (Black's Law Dictionary, *supra*; *Duskin v. State Board of Dry Cleaners, supra.*)

"There may be cases in which the conduct at issue is so extreme that the Department could conclude that it is *per se* contrary to public morals. By this we mean that it is so vile and its impact upon society is so corruptive, that it can be almost immediately repudiated as being contrary to the standards of morality generally accepted by the community after a proper balance is struck between personal freedom and social restraint. . . ." (Italics theirs.)

In *Smith v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, 485 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Feb. 26, 1971) the Kentucky Court of Appeals similarly followed the same rules:

"Appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, on the ground that no proof had been presented to show that the questioned matter was utterly without redeeming social value. The court properly overruled that motion, inasmuch as the publication demonstrated on its face that it possessed no such redeeming social value. That determination was properly made as a matter of law in the circumstances of this case . . . ." (Our emphasis.)



4. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE UPON WHICH THE GEORGIA COURT'S DECISION IS BASED i.e., THAT THE PUBLIC NUISANCE APPROACH CAN BE APPLIED TO RESTRAIN OBSCENITY, IS FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR ANGLO-SAXON LAW.

(a) UNDER THE COMMON LAW, OBSCENITY, INDECENCY AND LEWDNESS WERE A PUBLIC NUISANCE.

Obscenity or indecent exhibitions of a nature to shock the public sense of decency were a public nuisance and indictable at the Common Law. *Crain v. State*, 3 Inc. 193 (1951). In Perkins on Criminal Law, Foundation Press, 1954, Professor Rollin Perkins states, at page 336:

"Obscene or indecent exhibitions of a nature to shock the public sense of decency are also public nuisances and indictable at Common Law. This label includes not only obscene and indecent theatrical performances or side shows, but other disgusting practices such as letting a stallion to mares in the streets or some other public place . . . ."

For a modern application of this principle to some of the current problems which face this Nation, see *Bloss v. Paris Township*, 157 N.W.2d 260 (Apr. 1, 1968) holding the operation of an outdoor drive-in theater showing motion pictures which "dwell on the subject of sex and the human anatomy" to constitute a public nuisance. In *Bloss*, the Michigan Supreme Court stated the following, as to the nature of such public nuisances, at page 261:

"What is a public nuisance? Joyce, *Law of Nuisances*, Section 7, page 15, defines a public nuisance, inter alia, as an act which offends public decency.

Cited to Section 86, page 13, is the case of *Hayden v. Tucker*, 37 Mo. 214, in which it was held that the keeping of jacks and stallions within the immediate view of a private dwelling and a public highway is a nuisance which equity will enjoin as a 'disgusting annoyance perpetually bringing the blush of shame to modesty and innocence.' The factual difference between the *Hayden* and the instant case, is that there involved was a display of equine and here pictures of the human frame, is not a distinction calling for a different conclusion as to the nuisance question."

Similarly, in *Cactus Corporation d.b.a. The Apache Drive-in v. State of Arizona, ex rel Murphy*, 480 P.2d 375 (Feb. 9, 1971), the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2, recently affirmed the judgment of the trial court which permanently enjoined The Apache Drive-in Theater from displaying, showing or running a motion picture film, entitled "Lysistrata," or any other motion picture film of the same character, on the grounds that such activity is or would be a public nuisance as defined by A.R.S. Sect. 13-601, which defines, in part, a public nuisance as:

"Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by a considerable number of persons . . . ."

"On March 4, 1971, the Georgia Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, upheld the inherent right of law enforcement officials to enjoin the motion picture film "I Am Curious (Yellow)" as a public nuisance. In *Evans Theatre Corp.*



*et al. v. Slayton*, Dist. Atty. of Fulton County, Ga., 180 SE.2d 712 (Mar. 4, 1971), Presiding Judge Mobley, speaking for an unanimous court, said:

"We recognize the principle that equity will take no part in the administration of the criminal law. Code § 55-102. However, it has long been the rule in this State that the State has an interest in the welfare, peace, and good order of its citizens and communities, and that an action may be maintained at the instance of the prosecuting attorney to enjoin an existing or threatened public nuisance, even though the nuisance constitutes a crime punishable under the criminal laws. See: *Lofton v. Collins*, 117 Ga. 434 (3), 440 (43 SE 708, 61 LRA 150); *Walter v. McNelly*, 121 Ga. 114 (1), 115 (48 SE 718); *Edison v. Ramsey*, 146 Ga. 767 (92 SE 518); *Dean v. State*, 151 Ga. 371 (1) (106 SE 792, 40 ALR 1132); *Gullatt v. Collins*, 139 Ga. 538 (150 SE 825); *Rose Theatre, Inc. v. Lilly*, 185 Ga. 53 (1) (192 SE 866); *Atkinson v. Lam Amusement Co.*, 185 Ga. 379 (195 SE 156); *Forehand v. Moody*, 200 Ga. 166 (36 SE2d 321); *Norris v. Willingham*, 204 Ga. 441 (50 SE2d 22); *Thornton v. Forehand*, 211 Ga. 568 (87 SE2d 865); *Lee v. Hayes*, 215 -Ga. 330, 331 (110 SE2d 624).

"The exhibition of an obscene motion picture is a crime involving the welfare of the public at large, since it is contrary to the standards of decency and propriety of the community as a whole. The welfare of the whole community is served by restraining the showing of such an obscene film.

"A court of equity was authorized to enjoin the exhibition of this obscene motion picture to the public."

In the *Evans Theatre Case*, this Court denied review. See *Evans Theatre Corp. et al v. Slayton*, Dist. Atty. of Fulton County, U.S. 30 L.Ed.2, 267 S.Ct. (Nov. 9, 1971). See also *Judson v. Zurhorst*, 30 Ohio Cir. 9, at Page 14, where the Ohio court said:

"There remains one contention for the granting of this injunction on the facts alleged in the petition. That is on the alleged indecency of the pamphlet. The law does not favor obscenity or indecency.

"In a proper case instituted by one legally authorized to represent the public, the public exhibition of lewd pictures, immodest statuary, or immoral plays would unquestionably be enjoined, or otherwise suppressed; and for the same reason an obscene book or pamphlet is prohibited transit through the United States mail . . . ."

In *State of Ohio ex rel Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen" et al.*, 272 N.E.2d 137 (July 21, 1971), Amicus, as a private citizen, brought an abatement action against the exhibition of the motion picture "Vixen" in Cincinnati, Ohio (Hamilton County) under Section 3767.01 et seq., of the Ohio Revised Code, which authorizes a private party to bring such action. In that trial, the statute was upheld as against a claim of constitutional invalidity and the exhibition of the film at an indoor movie was held to be a public nuisance in Hamilton County. An appeal to the Court of Appeals, First Appellate District of Ohio, a similar attack was made against the statute on constitutional grounds, and as applied to the film itself. On July 20, 1970, the Court of Appeals, First Appellate District of Ohio upheld the constitutionality of the statute the principle involved and after trial *de novo*, declared the exhibition of the

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film to be a nuisance in the counties of Ohio in which it had jurisdiction. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment and that matter is presently before this Court. On March 13, 1971, the Clerk of the Court was directed to obtain the film for the Court's viewing.

Section 8767.01 et seq., of the Ohio Revised Code was recently before a 3-judge federal district court, convened under 28 U.S.C. Sections 2281-2284, upon a claim of the unconstitutionality of such statute. In that case, *Grove Press, Inc. et al. v. Anthony B. Flask*, 325 F. Supp. 574 (March 10, 1970), the court, in an unanimous decision (Celebreeze, Battisti and Green), upheld the constitutionality of the statute and its application in an abatement of the motion picture film, "I Am Curious (Yellow)" as a public nuisance. On July 6, 1970, Grove Press, Inc. filed its appeal in the United States Supreme Court. See *Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask*, October Term 1970, No. 360. As of this date, no action has been taken by this Court in this matter.

On the issue of whether indecency in the form of public lewdness in theatrical performances can be stopped in a civil action to abate a public nuisance in California, see *Weis v. Superior Court of San Diego County*, 30 Cal. App. 730, 159 P.464 (June 14, 1916). In *Weis*, that issue was before the District Court of Appeals, 2nd District, on a writ of prohibition. The District Attorney had commenced a civil action under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 731, to abate a theatrical performance on the ground that it was a public nuisance. The complaint alleged that under a concession granted by the Panama-California International Exhibition, the defendant was conducting upon the exposition grounds a public resort and place of amusement and entertainment, known as the "Sultan's Harem," in which certain women did

make in the presence of the general public a public exhibition and exposure of their naked person and private parts, which performance was alleged to be indecent and offensive to the senses and a public nuisance. The California court dismissed the defendant's application for a preemptory writ holding the action was properly brought. At page 465, the court said:

"While the acts here complained of clearly constitute a crime, they also constitute a nuisance within the meaning of Section 3479 of the Civil Code, which defines a nuisance as 'anything which is . . . indecent or offensive to the senses . . . so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . .' (Emphasis ours.)

"And Section 3480 of the same Code defines a public nuisance as: 'One which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or danger inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.'

"Mr. Joyce in his work on Nuisances, Section 409, says: 'A disorderly and disreputable theater may be enjoined although a common nuisance.'

"To the same effect is Wood on Nuisances, Section 68, where it is said: 'A public exhibition of any kind that tends to the corruption of morals, to a disturbance of the peace, or of the general good order and welfare of society, is a public nuisance. Under this head are included . . . obscene pictures and any and all exhibitions, the natural tendency of which is to pander to vicious . . . and disorderly members of society.'"

The *Weis* decision and rationale was cited with approval

by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Lim*, 18 Cal.2d 372, 118 P.2d 472 (Nov. 27, 1941). In the *Lim* case, the California Supreme Court noted, at page 476:

"Similarly in *Weis v. Superior*, 30 Cal. App. 730, 159 P.464, it was held that the District Attorney of San Diego County was authorized under Code of Civil Procedure, Section 731, to enjoin the performance of a public exhibition which was shown to have been indecent, and thus within the statutory definition of public nuisances in Civil Code Section 3749 . . . . The courts have thus refused to grant injunctions on behalf of the State except where the objectionable activity can be brought within the terms of the statutory definition of public nuisance . . . ." (Our emphasis.)

The theatrical performance in *Weis* was in the nature of a "concession" on the Exposition grounds. The latter fact infers that the performance was a commercial activity and was not visible to the public's eye without the payment of an admission price. See the recent decisions of this Court in *U. S. v. Reidel* 402 U.S. 351 (May 3, 1971) *Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs* 402 U.S. 363 (May 3, 1971) which accord no constitutional protection to such commercial activities.

More recently, the California Supreme Court indicated in dictum that it presently adheres to the Common Law rule noted above. In *Burton v. Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County*, 68 Cal. 2d 684, 441 P.2d 281, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721 (June 6, 1968), a licensing case involving the exhibition at a theater of films claimed to be obscene, that Court cited with approval the Abatement Statute which codifies the principle employed by the Georgia Supreme Court. While denying the right of an administrative board to refuse a license on an administrative fact finding



that the theater was a nuisance, the court pointed to the judicial Abatement Statute as a proper procedural employment of the "nuisance" concept. At page 728, the court said:

"<sup>15</sup>Section 103.31(b), under which the board may deny a permit 'for a business which has been or is a public nuisance' is likewise defective. The Civil Code defines a nuisance as 'Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any \*\*public park, square, street, or highway \* \* \*.' (Civ. Code § 3479) Section 3480 defines a public nuisance as 'one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any number of persons \* \* \*.' (See also, Pen. Code, §§ 370, 371.)

"The provisions of Section 103.31(b) are no less vague than those of Sections 103.29(b) and 103.31(c) 1. To permit a board to refuse to grant a license for the operation of a motion picture theater because in its subjective opinion the operation may be 'indecent or offensive to the senses \* \* so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property of 'any considerable number of persons' obviously vests in the board an exorbitant quantum of discretion and fails to meet the constitutional requirement of narrowly circumscribed standards.

"<sup>16</sup> We note in passing that the law provides ample methods for eliminating the existence of a nuisance, by indictment or information, or by the bringing of a civil

suit or an action for abatement. (Civ. Code § 3491) It is, of course, within the authority of a municipal legislative body to prescribe what constitutes a nuisance. (Gov. Code, § 38771; *City of Bakersfield v. Miller* (1986), 65 Cal. 2d 93, 100, 48 Cal. Rptr. 889, 410 P.2d 393.) However, the policy board is not a legislative agency, and we are not concerned here with whether particular activity has been properly defined as a nuisance but only with whether an administrative board may refuse to grant a permit to petitioners because in its subjective opinion the business which they operate 'has been or is a public nuisance.'" (Our emphasis.)

In *People ex rel Hicks v. "Sarong Gals"* 103 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Aug. 3, 1972) the Court of Appeal in California was faced with a case involving subject matter which differed from the type of conduct herein, only, in that there the "lewdness" was "live," rather than "filmed." In upholding the application of the Red Light Abatement Law to abate, as a nuisance, continuing acts of lewdness sans evidence of prostitution, the Court held at page 417:

"The behavior described in the instant case amounts purely and simply to an exhibition calculated to arouse latent sexual desires and release the inhibitions of the viewers rather than a mode of expressing emotion and dramatic feeling by the performer.

"While our Supreme Court has held that amusement and entertainment as well as the expression of ideas are encompassed within the right of freedom of speech (In *re Giannini*, *supra*, 69 Cal.2d 563, 569, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535; *Weaver v. Jordan*, 64 Cal.2d 235, 242, 49 Cal.Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289), entertainment value per se does not give an activity redeeming social



importance. Presumably, the Romans of the First Century derived entertainment from witnessing Christians being devoured by lions. Given the right audience, the spectacle of a man committing an act of sodomy on another man would provide entertainment value. However, neither this spectacle nor the activities described in the instant case are invested with constitutionally protected values merely because they entertain viewers. However chaotic the law may be in this field, no court has as yet adopted such an extreme result.

"Public display such as those described above are within the type of public nuisances traditionally within the power of the state to regulate and prohibit. They involve no significant countervailing First Amendment consideration. Attempts to present this type of commercialized lewdness under the mantle of the First Amendment under a concept of communication of ideas stretches reason.

"We hold that the "entertainment" described in the instant case is lewd and, therefore, not afforded the protection of freedom of speech under the First Amendment. The acts of the "entertainers" or "dancers" in the instant case were purely and simply obscene acts performed for the purpose of inciting the sexual desires and imaginations of a group of randy, beer drinking patrons. As such, these acts amount to conduct not protected by the First Amendment. The prevention of these acts does not hinder the market place of ideas or freedom to distribute information and opinion."

In answering arguments that the legislature did not intend the statute to encompass that type of activity, the

court said at page 416:

"Defendants contend that when the Red Light Abatement Law was enacted (1913), the Legislature did not have in mind the type of activity described above."

"This is apparently true. History does not record the existence of any topless-bottom-less bars offering the type of entertainment described herein in 1913. Western folklore has it that prostitutes were good-hearted wenches who bedded their customers with no shilly-shallying around, nursed the sick in times of emergency, eventually married homesteaders and became pillars of the community. However, even prior to 1913, the exploitation of sexual desires for profit was apparently recognized as a social problem. Thus the Legislature specifically included lewdness as one of the grounds of the court's power to curb a public nuisance. In *People v. Bayside Land Co.*, 48 Cal.App. 257, 191 P. 994, the court held that lewdness - even though no incidents of prostitution or assignation had occurred - came within the Red Light Abatement Law."

Carried as a footnote, the Court also made the following observation:

"It can be argued with equal persuasion that the authors of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution would be more than a trifle shocked were they to discover some of the more bizarre behavior now protected by that amendment's lofty concept of freedom of speech."

It should be noted that the legislative "intent," in Georgia follows the broad interpretation given to the term "lewdness" by the California Court in the "Sarong Gals" case, and is in harmony with the decision of the Georgia Supreme

Court below. Section 61-116 of the Georgia Code makes all leases and agreements for the letting of structures for purposes of prostitution to be void, and specifically states that "The term 'prostitution' as used in this law shall be construed to include the offering or giving of the body for sexual intercourse, sexual perversion, obscenity and/or lewdness for hire . . ." (Our emphasis.)

(b) THE RIGHT TO PROSCRIBE OBSCENITY IS A TENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT, GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS WHICH RESERVES TO THE STATES AND TO THE PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO CONTROL AND REGULATE "PUBLIC MORALITY" i.e., PUBLIC CONDUCT, WHICH AFFECTS THE PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. OBSCENITY CONTROLS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO REACH "PRIVATE MORALITY."

Obscenity controls do not attempt to reach *private morality* such as what a person may read or see. The proscription of obscenity is grounded upon the legitimate governmental aim of controlling and regulating "public morality" — public conduct, which affects the people as a whole.

Although it is true that the governmental restraints imposed by such obscenity laws must, of necessity, *indirectly* restrict the availability of such materials for some persons who might wish to see movies, such as are involved herein, that same result is obtained whenever any "vice" laws are enforced, such as those proscribing prostitution. It would be, however, a gross distortion of the law to suggest that this indirect effect on private morals is the basis for such criminal sanctions and thus an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of an individual.

Law and morality are not identical. Although interrelated, they are necessarily distinct. Not every moral evil is proscribed by man-made law. Public morality is to be distinguished from private morality, as to which it is often said, the law does not concern itself. On the other hand, our law has always recognized the importance of maintaining a high public morality.

Nowhere was the function of such "vice" laws more clearly stated than in the arguments of the prosecutor two and one-half centuries ago in the first obscenity conviction in *Rex v. Curl*, 2 Strange 789 (1727):

"3. As to Morality. Destroying that is destroying the peace of the government for government is no more than public order, which is morality. My Lord Chief Justice Hale used to say Christianity is part of the law, and why not morality too? I do not insist that every immoral act is indictable, such as telling a lie, or the like; but if it is destructive of morality in general, if it does, or may, affect all the King's subjects, it then is an offense of a public nature. And upon this distinction it is that particular acts of fornication are not punishable in the Temporal Courts (Common Law courts) and bawdy houses are. In Sir Charles Sedley's case it was said, that this Court is the *custos-morum* of the King's subjects. 1 Sid. 168." (Our emphasis.)

Louis B. Schwartz, co-reporter of the Model Penal Code, explains the governmental function of the obscenity crime in society as follows, in 63 Columbia Law Review, *Morals Offenses*, and the Model Penal Code (cited by this Court with approval in *Ginzburg v. U.S.*, 16 L.Ed.2d 38, fn. 12; page 39, fn. 14, page 41, fn. 19; *Mishkin v. N.Y.*, 16 L.Ed. 2d 53, fn. 9; and *Stanley*, 394 U.S. 557, fn. 10) at page 671:

"But the great majority of people believe that the morals of 'bad' people do, at least in the long run, threaten the security of the 'good' people . . . it is hard to deny people the right to legislate on the basis of their beliefs not demonstrably erroneous, especially if these beliefs are strongly held by a very large majority. The majority cannot be expected to abandon a credo, and its associated sensitivities, however irrational, in deference to a minority's skepticism."

And at page 672:

"If unanimity of strongly held moral view is approached in a community, the rebel puts himself, as it were, outside the society when he arranges himself against those views . . . the community cannot be expected to make (his) first protests respectable or even tolerated by the law . . ."

Mr. Schwartz continues, at page 681:

"But equally, it is not merely sin-control of the sort that evoked Professor Henkin's constitutional doubts. Instead, the community is merely saying, 'Sin, if you must, in private. Do not flaunt your immoralities where they will grieve and shock others. If we do not impose our morals upon you, neither must you impose yours upon us, undermining the restraint we seek to cultivate through family, church, and school.' The interest being protected is not directly or exclusively, the souls of those who might be depraved or corrupted by the obscenity, but the right of parents to shape the moral notions of their children, and the right of the general public not to be subjected to violent psychological affront." (Our emphasis.)



Concerning the power of government to regulate matters relating to public morals and power to say what is offensive to public morality, this Court said in *Mugler v. Kansas*, 123 U.S. 623 (1887):

"The power to determine such questions (what is offensive to public morality) so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; else society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding their own appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under our system that power is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as police powers of state, and to determine primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety . . . ."

(Our emphasis.)

See also, Federal District Judge Peirson Hall speaking on "The Monster Vice" in *U.S. v. Four (4) Books*, 289 F. supp. 972 at 973 (Sept. 10, 1968), cited herein at p.4 footnote 4.

The existence of the vice of obscenity is the symptom of a disorder which probability tells us, will lead to ruin. Historian Arnold Toynbee tells us that 19 out of the 21 great civilizations which flourished in world history, crumbled into ruin . . . not because of armed aggression from without but because of moral decay from within. In 1874 Justice Swayne, speaking for an unanimous United States Supreme Court in *Trist v. Child*, 21 Wallace 441, 450 (1874) had the following to say about the nature of the underpinnings of this Nation:

"The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are at once sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the structure is weakened. When it is destroyed the fabric must fall. Such is the voice of history . . . ."

In sum, the case for the governmental action against obscenity was stated by the Associate Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in *Roth v. U.S.*, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (June 22, 1957), at page 502:

"The state can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of time the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral standards . . . ."

The long range indirect effects inference, accepted by Mr. Justice Harlan, was acknowledged by a majority of this Court in *Ginsberg v. N.Y.*, 390 U.S. 629, 20 L.Ed.2d 195, 86 S.Ct. 942, where the Court referred to the observations of psychiatrist Dr. Gaylin (with apparent approval) at page 642, fn. 10:

" . . . but despite the vigor of the ongoing controversy whether obscene material will perceptively create a danger of anti-social conduct, or will probably induct its recipient in such conduct, a medical practitioner recently suggested that the possibility of harmful effect to youth cannot be dismissed as frivolous. Dr. Gaylin of the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic, reporting on the view of some psychiatrists in 77 Yale Law Review at 592-593, said:

"It is the period of growth (of youth) when these patterns of behavior are laid down, when environmental stimuli of all sorts must be integrated into a



workable sense of self, when sensuality is being defined and fears elaborated, when pleasure controls. It is in this period, undramatically and with time, that legalized pornography may conceivably be damaging.'

"Dr. Gaylin emphasizes that a child might not be as well prepared as an adult to make an intelligent choice as to the material he chooses to read:

"Psychiatrists . . . made a distinction between the reading of pornography, as unlikely to be per se harmful, and the permitting of the reading of pornography, which was conceived as potentially destructive. The child is protected in the reading of pornography by the knowledge that it is pornographic, i.e., disapproved. It is outside of parental standards and not a part of his identification processes. To openly permit implies parental approval and even suggests seductive encouragement. If this is so of parental approval, it is equally so of societal approval - another potent influence on the developing ego.'"

It seems obvious to Amicus herein that, in the context employed, those members of this Court who joined in that opinion must have recognized the "indirect" effects on public morals in the nature of a scandal-giving seduction, i.e., "public nuisance."

A nation whose public morals are preoccupied with sex is thought to be sick. The ultimate evil would be a society in which sex pictures, novels and magazines are available at every store, sex pictures on every marquee, sex movies in every theater, sex pictures in every art gallery, and sex language in every dialogue. To the extent that we have

attained that status, we must acknowledge that we have lost control of public order and are closing the gap on the public morality of the ancient community of "Sodom and Gomorrah." The anti-social conduct of today's society becomes the socially acceptable conduct of the new community. Recognizing that the evolution of man in civilized society is a slow-moving process, Amicus respectfully suggest that the individual members of this Court should examine and consider the suggestion that in the biblical days of Sodom and Gomorrah there must have been justices whose liberal views on public morality contributed to the destruction of those two cities. It matters not that in our present morally weakened society, there are many members of our "adult" community who may personally find it difficult to maintain high principles. In a civilized society hypocrisy is the complement that vice pays to virtue.

During the past two years, the above stated concepts relating to the legitimate interest of government in controlling and regulating "public morality" have been subjected to a constant and determined attack, under a claim that the Federal Constitution required that obscenity should be immune where commercially exhibited to consenting adults in an enclosed theater. This erroneous misconception, arising out of an interpretation placed on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (Apr. 7, 1969) was finally laid to rest on May 3, 1971, by this Court's decisions in *U.S. v. Reidel* (*supra*) and *U.S. v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs* (*supra*). In *U.S. v. Reidel*, Justice White, speaking for six members of the Court, said at page 815:

"Section 1461 of Title 18, U.S.C., prohibits the knowing use of the mails for the delivery of obscene matter.

The issue presented by the jurisdictional statement in this case is whether §1461 is constitutional as applied to the distribution of obscene materials to willing recipients who state that they are adults. The District Court held that it was not. We disagree and reverse judgment."

and at page 816:

"In *Roth v. United States*, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Roth was convicted under §1461 for mailing obscene circulars and advertising. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that 'obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press' *id.*, at 485, and that §1461, 'applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, do(es) not offend constitutional safeguards against convictions based upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited.' *Id.*, at 492. Roth has not been overruled. It remains the law in this Court and governs this case. Reidel, like Roth, was charged with using the mails for the distribution of obscene material. His conviction, if it occurs and the materials are found in fact to be obscene, would be no more vulnerable than was Roth's.

"*Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), compels no different result. There, pornographic films were found in Stanley's home and he was convicted under Georgia statutes for possessing obscene material. This Court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime. But it neither overruled nor disturbed the holding in *Roth*. Indeed, in the Court's view, the constitutionality of proscribing private pos-

session of obscenity was a matter of first impression in this Court, a question neither involved nor decided in Roth. The Court made its point expressly: 'Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today's holding. As we have said, the states retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.' Ibid. Nothing in Stanley questioned the validity of Roth insofar as the distribution of obscene material was concerned. Clearly the Court had no thought of questioning the validity of §1461 as applied to those who, like Reidel, are routinely disseminating obscenity through the mails and who have no claim, and could make none, about unwanted governmental intrusions into the privacy of their home. The Court considered this sufficiently clear to warrant summary affirmance of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejecting claims that under Stanley v. Georgia, Georgia's obscenity statute could not be applied to book sellers. Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970)."

In *U.S. v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs* (*supra*) the same majority of six came to an identical holding in a case involving the right of the Federal Government to seize obscene materials at the point of entry into this country and to institute a civil action in the federal courts to declare the subject matter to be contraband and subject to forfeiture. Mr. Justice White, writing for four members of the Court, held as follows, at page 833:

"We next consider Luros' second claim, which is based upon Stanley v. Georgia, *supra*. On the authority of Stanley, Luros urged the trial court to construe the

First Amendment as forbidding any restraints on obscenity except where necessary to protect children or where it intruded itself upon the sensitivity or privacy of an unwilling adult. Without rejecting this position, the trial court read Stanley as protecting, at the very least, the right to read obscene material in the privacy of one's own home and to receive it for that purpose. It therefore held that § 1305(a), which bars the importation of obscenity for private use as well as for commercial distribution, is overbroad and hence unconstitutional.

"The trial court erred in reading Stanley as immunizing from seizure obscene materials possessed at a port of entry for the purpose of importation for private use. In *United States v. Reidel*, ante, we have today held that Congress may constitutionally prevent the mails from being used for distributing pornography. In this case, neither Luros nor his putative buyers have rights which are infringed by the exclusion of obscenity from incoming foreign commerce. By the same token, obscene materials may be removed from the channels of commerce when discovered in the luggage of a returning foreign traveler even though intended solely for his private use. That the private user under Stanley may not be prosecuted for possession of obscenity in his home does not mean that he is entitled to import it from abroad free from the power of Congress to exclude noxious articles from commerce. Stanley's emphasis was on the freedom of thought and mind in the privacy of the home. But a port of entry is not a traveler's home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of



unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search. Customs officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned in this case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country . . . ."

To use the language of this Court in *U.S. v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs*, the judicial power to abate "obscenity" as a public nuisance is an "old practice" which is "intimately associated with excluding" morally corruptive articles from the communities.

Amicus emphasizes the relevance and importance of *U.S. v. Reidel* and *U. S. v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs*, to the issues raised on this appeal and the major problem confronting this Nation insofar as the runaway nature of "public lewdness" on the public screen and elsewhere is concerned. (See pp 11-63 and Appendices "B", "C", "D" and "E".) It is now quite clear from these decisions that (1) actual prior restraints by way of court order, for a reasonable period of time in advance of a final determination of the legal issue by the trial court and after decision by the trial court are constitutional, and (2) no property interest attaches to obscene materials which are possessed for commercial use and (3) the obscene materials can properly be made the subject of forfeiture as contraband.

In Amicus' view, it is inconceivable that all of the issues herein are not already decided by this Court's opinions in *Reidel* (supra) and *Thirty-seven (37) Photographs* (supra).



(c) THERE IS A JUSTIFIABLE GOVERNMENTAL GROUND FOR THE REGULATION OF OBSCENITY BY STATES IN WHATEVER FORM IT MIGHT TAKE.

The power of the State in the area of public morals is broad. In *Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown*, 354 U.S. 438, 1 L.Ed2d 1169, 77 S.Ct. 1325 (June 24, 1957) decided on the same date as *Roth-Alberts*, 354 U.S. 476, Justice Frankfurter had the following to say concerning the power of states in this area, at Page 440:

"In an unbroken series of cases extending over a long stretch of this Court's history, it has been accepted as a postulate that 'the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.' *Id.* 238 US at 716. And so our starting point is that New York can constitutionally convict appellants of keeping for sale the booklets incontestably found to be obscene. *Alberts v. California*, decided this day (1 L.ed2d 1948). The immediate problem then is whether New York can adopt as an auxiliary means of dealing with such obscene merchandising the procedure of Section 22-a.

"We need not linger over the suggestion that something can be drawn out of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that restricts New York to the criminal process in seeking to protect its people against the dissemination of pornography. It is not for this Court thus to limit the State in resorting to various weapons in the armory of the law. Whether proscribed conduct is to be visited by a criminal prosecution or by a *qui tam* action or by an injunction or by some or all of these remedies in combination, is a

matter within the legislature's range of choice. See *Tigner v. Texas*, 310 US 141, 148, 84 L.ed1124, 1128, 80 S. Ct. 879, 130 ALR 1321. If New York chooses to subject persons who disseminate obscene 'literature' to criminal prosecution and also to deal with such books as deodands of old, or both, with due regard, of course, to appropriate opportunities for the trial of the underlying issue, it is not for us to gainsay its selection of remedies. Just as *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 US 697, 75 L.ed1357, 51 S.Ct. 625, *supra*, one of the landmark opinions in shaping the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and of the press, left no doubts that 'Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an absolute right,' 283 US at 708, it likewise made clear that the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.' *Id.*, 283 US at 716. To be sure the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship."

5. THE MOTION PICTURE FILMS "MAGIC MIRROR" AND "IT ALL COMES OUT IN THE END" ARE OBSCENE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND A PUBLIC NUISANCE PER SE.

An examination and analysis of the Time-Motion Studies for "Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out In The End," appearing herein at pages 11-41 and 43-63 demonstrates beyond all doubt that the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling was plainly correct. "Reasonable men could not differ and could come to but one conclusion" - the test for material which is obscene as a matter of law. See Point 1A3, *supra*, at pages 100-106 and the cases cited therein.

Acts and conduct which result in injury to the people are

a public nuisance. Such injury is manifest from the incessant display of lewdness on the public screen. See the time-motion studies for both films, and note, in particular, the narrative legend for each segment of the film appearing at the bottom of each page.

The visual depiction in public of the above sexual acts, if performed off-stage in 3-dimensional form would be the subject for a criminal complaint. When performed in 2-dimensional form, either realistically or simulated, the same are incontrovertibly contrary to the good morals, common custom, public policy, and common conscience of the community of the Nation as a whole.

By way of illustration, Appellants submit that if Sodomy or sexual perversion is a violation of the law prohibiting "lewdness," then the public display of such acts, real or simulated, by way of motion pictures is also contrary to the public policy and in violation of the obscenity laws as a matter of law. It is no answer to suggest that if this were so, then the motion picture presentation of simulated murder would be illegal. That, of course, would be a *non sequitur*, for there is no law which prohibits the pictorial portrayal of simulated murder, whereas there is an almost universally recognized law which prohibits the pictorial portrayal of indecent public conduct and that is the law against "lewdness" in public displays.

### CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

Georgia Supreme Court below, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted

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APPENDIX B

CHIEF OF POLICE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, REPORT IN  
REPLY TO LETTER OF MAY 1, 1931, FROM THE  
CHIEF OF POLICE, NEW YORK, N. Y., DATED  
MAY 1, 1931, RE: "MURDER OF ALVIN KARPIS".  
ON MAY 1, 1931, THE CHIEF OF POLICE, CHICAGO,  
RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF POLICE,  
NEW YORK, N. Y., DATED MAY 1, 1931, IN  
WHICH THE CHIEF OF POLICE, NEW YORK, N. Y.,  
REQUESTED THAT THE CHIEF OF POLICE, CHICAGO,  
ADVISE HIM AS TO THE STATUS OF THE  
CASE OF ALVIN KARPIS, WHO WAS ARRESTED  
IN CHICAGO ON MAY 1, 1931, AND IS NOW  
BEING HELD IN THE CHICAGO HOUSE OF  
CORRECTION.

Georgia Southern Coast Survey should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted

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United States

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A P P E N D I X    A

ORIGINAL OPINION OF GEORGIA SUPREME COURT IN  
SLATON et al v. PARIS ADULT THEATRE, et al.,  
DATED Nov. 5, 1971, SUPERSEDED ON Nov. 19, 1971,  
BY NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER TO PERMIT THE COURT TO  
RULE ON THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW AS IF ON A HEAR-  
ING FOR A FINAL INJUNCTION (AS PER THE STIPULA-  
TION APPEARING IN THE RECORD, WHICH WAS OVERLOOKED  
BY THE COURT IN ITS RULING) . . . . . A-2-A-9.

Decided: Nov. 5, 1971

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

26631 SLATON, District Attorney, Et Al v.  
PARIS ADULT THEATRE I, Et Al

1. Where, in a proceeding by the district attorney to have certain motion picture films declared to be obscene and subject to be seized and seeking temporarily and permanently to enjoin the showing of the same, the matter came on for a hearing pursuant to an ex-parte order requiring the defendants to show cause on a day certain 10 days from the issuance of such order why the relief prayed for should not be granted and why a temporary injunction should not issue, it was error for the trial judge on such hearing to finally adjudicate the merits of the case and to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.
2. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find that the films involved in this case are obscene. Upon such a finding, their exhibition in a commercial theater to willing adult audiences may be properly enjoined since it is not protected by the first amendment.
3. The denial of a temporary injunction in this case exposed the plaintiff to the hazard that the question sought to be adjudicated might become moot, and under the principle of the balancing of conveniences, it was error to deny a temporary injunction restraining the exhibition of the films.

HAWES, Justice. The appeal in this case is from the judgment and order of the Superior Court of Fulton County

refusing a temporary injunction against the showing by the defendants, Paris Adult Theatre I and Paris Adult Theatre II, of two allegedly obscene motion pictures. Following the procedure approved by this court in *Evans Theater Corp. v. Slaton*, 227 Ga. 377 (180 SE2d 712), and followed in *Walter, et al. v. Slaton*, 227 Ga. 676 (182 SE2d 464), and in *1024 Peachtree Corp., et al., v. Slaton* (No. 26612; decided . . . Lewis R. Slaton, as District Attorney of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit, and Hinson McAuliffe, as Solicitor General of the Criminal Court of Fulton County, filed a complaint against the theaters and named individuals praying for a rule nisi to require the defendants to show cause on a date certain why the motion picture films, "It All Comes Out In The End," and "Magic Mirror," should not be declared obscene and subject to be seized, and seeking in each case an order requiring the defendants to produce the aforesaid motion picture films and that they be temporarily and permanently enjoined from exhibiting the same. The rule nisi was duly issued and served in each case, and an adversary hearing was held pursuant thereto on January 13, 1971 before a Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County. After viewing the motion pictures and hearing the evidence, the trial judge rendered the following judgment: "The State contends that the motion picture under review in the above actions are obscene. The titles of the films are, "It All Comes Out In The End," and "Magic Mirror." Assuming that obscenity is established by a finding that the actors cavorted about in the nude indiscriminately, then these films may fairly be considered obscene. Both films are clearly designed to entertain the spectator and perhaps, depending on the viewer, to appeal to his or her prurient interest. The portrayal of the sex act is undertaken; but the act itself is consistently only

a simulated one if, indeed, the viewer can assume an act of intercourse or of fellatio is occurring from the machinations which are portrayed on the screen. Each of the films is childish, unimaginative, and altogether boring in its sameness.

"It appears to the Court that the display of these films in a commercial theater, when surrounded by requisite notice to the public of their nature and by reasonable protection against the exposure of these films to minors, is constitutionally permissible.

"IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT the films, even though they display the human body and the human personality in a most degrading fashion, are not obscene.

"The actions against the Defendants, therefore, are dismissed.

"This 12th day of April, 1971.

Jack Etheridge, Judge, Superior  
Court of Fulton County, Atlanta  
Judicial Circuit."

The appeal is from this order. The grounds of enumerated error are that the court erred in declaring each of the films to be not obscene, in refusing to enjoin the defendant from exhibiting each of said motion pictures, and in dismissing the appellant's complaint against the defendants.

1. As was pointed out in *Walter v. Slaton*, supra, the initial hearing in this kind of proceeding presents for the judge's decision only the question of whether there is probable cause to hold the material in question to be obscene, and, therefore, whether the exhibition of a motion picture or

the distribution of literature shall be temporarily enjoined until the ultimate question of obscenity can be passed upon by a jury. Therefore, "on the hearing of an application for an interlocutory injunction, the presiding judge should not undertake to finally adjudicate issues of fact, but should pass on such questions only so far as to determine whether the evidence authorizes the grant or refusal of the interlocutory relief." *Florida Central R. Co. v. Cherokee Sawmill Co.*, 137 Ga. 815 (6) (74 SE 523); *Kight v. Gilliard*, 214 Ga. 445 (2)(105 SE2d 333); *Smith v. Davis*, 222 Ga. 839, 841 (152 SE2d 870); *Oliver v. Forshee*, 224 Ga. 200, 202 (160 SE2d 828). In the instant case, a question of fact was presented as to whether applying contemporary community standards the dominant theme of the films in question, taken as a whole, is to the prurient interest, and whether they are entirely without redeeming social value. The films themselves were in evidence. They spoke for themselves, and we have reviewed them in the discharge of our function as a court of review, along with the transcript of the oral testimony of the so-called expert witness who testified on the trial on behalf of the defendants as to the redeeming social value of the films, when considered in connection with the films themselves made an issue of fact as to whether the films are obscene, this was a question which, under our procedure, necessarily had to be submitted to the jury upon the final determination of the case, and under the cases last cited it was clearly error for the trial judge to pass an order dismissing the complaint. It cannot be said under the state of the record before this court that a finding in favor of the complainants could not under any conceivably provable circumstances be authorized.

2. Appellees contend, and the judge of the superior court



found that, inasmuch as the evidence in this case shows that the films which the solicitor seeks to seize are shown in a theater which carries on the front thereof the warning that it is for adults only and that "You must be 21 and able to prove it. If viewing the nude body offends you - PLEASE DO NOT ENTER," the exhibition of the films in this context is permissible and that the State cannot, without violating first amendment rights, constitutionally prohibit it. They rely in support of this position upon the case of *Stanley v. Ga.*, 394 U.S. 557, and other Federal and State cases following it. That case, however, is not authority for the position which appellees take. It dealt, not with the commercial distribution of pornography, but with the right of Stanley to possess, in the privacy of his home, pornographic films. In one of the most recent, if not the most recent, case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with this kind of material that court has expressly limited the scope of Stanley and has thereby effectively answered this contention of the appellees. *U.S. v. Reidel*, U.S. , 28 L.Ed 2d 813, 91 S. Ct. . That case involved the distribution through the mails of an admittedly obscene publication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461. The material was mailed to recipients who responded to a newspaper advertisement which required the recipient to state in his order therefor that he was 21 years of age. Reidel was indicted but the trial court granted his motion to dismiss the indictment, and upon review, the Supreme Court, in reversing that judgment, reiterated the ruling in *Roth v. U.S.*, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed 2d 1498, 77 S. Ct. 1304, that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." In so ruling, the Supreme Court expressly held that the government could constitutionally prohibit the distribution \*



of obscene materials through the mails, even though the distribution be limited to willing recipients who state that they are adults, and, further, that the constitutional right of a person to possess obscene material in the privacy of his own home, as expressed in Stanley, does not carry with it the right to sell and deliver such material. As we view the holding in the Reidel case, it is dispositive of the appellees' contention, and the ruling of the trial court that the showing of these films in a commercial theater under the circumstances shown in this case is constitutionally permissible. The defendants in this case were making sales and delivery of the films involved in the only practical way in which it could be done, that is, by selling to the public the right to come into their theater and view the showing of such films. No reason exists why the sale and delivery of these films should be immune to State control any more than the sale and delivery of multiple copies of an obscene book, pamphlet or magazine. Those who choose to pass through the front door of the defendant's theater and purchase a ticket to view the films and who certify thereby that they are more than 21 years of age are willing recipients of the material in the same legal sense as were those in the Reidel case, who, after reading the newspaper advertisements of the material, mailed an order to the defendant accepting his solicitation to sell them the obscene booklet involved there. That case clearly establishes once and for all that the sale and delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not protected under the first amendment.

Appellee also contends, and the trial judge so found, that the sexual activity depicted in these films is merely simulated, and that, being such, it is not obscene. This contention we unhesitatingly and utterly reject. True, the

activity in the films here involved is not revealed in the explicit detail embodied in the films in the Walter case. But, we held in the Evans Theater case that, "I Am Curious Yellow," depicted hard core pornography. In that case, only simulated sexual activity was involved. The films in this case leave little to the imagination. It is plain what they purport to depict, that is, conduct of the most salacious character. We held that these films may be found to be obscene, and upon such a finding the showing of such films should be enjoined since their exhibition is not protected by the first amendment.

3. Generally, in the granting or denying of a temporary injunction, a wide discretion is vested in the judge of the superior court, and unless some substantial equity has been violated, this court will not control his exercise of that discretion in passing such interlocutory order unless it is shown to have been clearly abused. *Jones v. Johnson*, 60 Ga. 260 (3); *Green v. Fuller*, 223 Ga. 204 (1) (154 SE2d 220); *Mar-Pak Michigan, Inc. v. Pointer*, 225 Ga. 307, 309 (168 SE2d 141); *J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock*, 226 Ga. 480, 488 (9) (175 SE2d 847). However, where it is clear from the order appealed from that the trial judge did not deny the temporary injunction in the exercise of his discretion, but that his denial was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, the foregoing rule does not apply. *Ballard v. Waites*, 194 Ga. 427, 429 (2) (21 SE2d 848), and *cits.* Accordingly, under such circumstances, in reviewing the denial of a temporary injunction, this court should consider whether upon the application of the principle of the balancing of conveniences the denial of a temporary injunction would leave the plaintiff practically remediless in the event he should thereafter establish his right to a permanent injunc-

tion. *Everett v. Tabor*, 119 Ga. 128 (4), 130 (46 SE 72); *Maddox v. Willis*, 205 Ga. 596 (5) (54 SE2d 632); *Stephens v. State Highway Department*, 223 Ga. 713, 714 (1) (157 SE2d 751). Applying the foregoing propositions to the facts of this case, it is apparent that a temporary injunction was necessary in order to protect the jurisdiction of the court and to prevent the case from becoming moot. It follows that the trial judge erred in denying the temporary injunction.

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

State Statutes, Standards

Dealing With

Offenses Against Morality and Decency

ANALYZED BY STATE AND LOCAL LEGAL AGENCIES

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE  
AMERICAN RED CROSS  
HAS THE HONOR TO ANNOUNCE  
THAT THE AMERICAN RED CROSS  
HAS BEEN AWARDED THE  
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
AWARD FOR THE YEAR 1917  
FOR THE SERVICES OF THE  
AMERICAN RED CROSS  
DURING THE YEAR 1917  
IN THE FIELD OF  
HUMANITARIAN WORK  
AND TO PRESENT THE AWARD  
TO THE AMERICAN RED CROSS  
ON THE 15TH DAY OF  
JANUARY 1918 AT THE  
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE AMERICAN RED CROSS  
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**Appendix B.****State Statutory Standards****Dealing With****Offenses Against Morality and Decency.****ARRANGED BY STATE AND TOPIC**

defined: "To the greatest extent, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 41-2715 (f)



DECENCY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY Indec. Ex.	NUDITY	MORAL NUISANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	INCEST	PROSTITU- TION
<b>CALIFORNIA</b>										
Penal Code 11 et seq.	PC 314, 350 1/2	Obscene live conduct PC 311.6	Topless waitresses and enter- tainers Penal Code	Nuisance: "lewdness, assignation or prostitu- tion..." PC 11225	Vulgar, profane or indecent PC 415	PC 260a 260b	Cohabitation PC 263a 269b	PC 266 269 A	PC 261	Penal Code 647  Nuisance PC 11225
Penal Code 260a, 260b, 263a, 269b, 269c, 269d, 269e, 269f, 269g, 269h, 269i, 269j, 269k, 269l, 269m, 269n, 269o, 269p, 269q, 269r, 269s, 269t, 269u, 269v, 269w, 269x, 269y, 269z, 269aa, 269ab, 269ac, 269ad, 269ae, 269af, 269ag, 269ah, 269ai, 269aj, 269ak, 269al, 269am, 269an, 269ao, 269ap, 269aq, 269ar, 269as, 269at, 269au, 269av, 269aw, 269ax, 269ay, 269az, 269ba, 269bb, 269bc, 269bd, 269be, 269bf, 269bg, 269bh, 269bi, 269bj, 269bk, 269bl, 269bm, 269bn, 269bo, 269bp, 269bq, 269br, 269bs, 269bt, 269bu, 269bv, 269bw, 269bx, 269by, 269bz, 269ca, 269cb, 269cc, 269cd, 269ce, 269cf, 269cg, 269ch, 269ci, 269cj, 269ck, 269cl, 269cm, 269cn, 269co, 269cp, 269cq, 269cr, 269cs, 269ct, 269cu, 269cv, 269cw, 269cx, 269cy, 269cz, 269da, 269db, 269dc, 269dd, 269de, 269df, 269dg, 269dh, 269di, 269dj, 269dk, 269dl, 269dm, 269dn, 269do, 269dp, 269dq, 269dr, 269ds, 269dt, 269du, 269dv, 269dw, 269dx, 269dy, 269dz, 269ea, 269eb, 269ec, 269ed, 269ee, 269ef, 269eg, 269eh, 269ei, 269ej, 269ek, 269el, 269em, 269en, 269eo, 269ep, 269eq, 269er, 269es, 269et, 269eu, 269ev, 269ew, 269ex, 269ey, 269ez, 269fa, 269fb, 269fc, 269fd, 269fe, 269ff, 269fg, 269fh, 269fi, 269fj, 269fk, 269fl, 269fm, 269fn, 269fo, 269fp, 269fq, 269fr, 269fs, 269ft, 269fu, 269fv, 269fw, 269fx, 269fy, 269fz, 269ga, 269gb, 269gc, 269gd, 269ge, 269gf, 269gg, 269gh, 269gi, 269gj, 269gk, 269gl, 269gm, 269gn, 269go, 269gp, 269gq, 269gr, 269gs, 269gt, 269gu, 269gv, 269gw, 269gx, 269gy, 269gz, 269ha, 269hb, 269hc, 269hd, 269he, 269hf, 269hg, 269hh, 269hi, 269hj, 269hk, 269hl, 269hm, 269hn, 269ho, 269hp, 269hq, 269hr, 269hs, 269ht, 269hu, 269hv, 269hw, 269hx, 269hy, 269hz, 269ia, 269ib, 269ic, 269id, 269ie, 269if, 269ig, 269ih, 269ii, 269ij, 269ik, 269il, 269im, 269in, 269io, 269ip, 269iq, 269ir, 269is, 269it, 269iu, 269iv, 269iw, 269ix, 269iy, 269iz, 269ja, 269jb, 269jc, 269jd, 269je, 269jf, 269jg, 269jh, 269ji, 269jj, 269jk, 269jl, 269jm, 269jn, 269jo, 269jp, 269jq, 269jr, 269js, 269jt, 269ju, 269jv, 269jw, 269jx, 269jy, 269jz, 269ka, 269kb, 269kc, 269kd, 269ke, 269kf, 269kg, 269kh, 269ki, 269kj, 269kk, 269kl, 269km, 269kn, 269ko, 269kp, 269kq, 269kr, 269ks, 269kt, 269ku, 269kv, 269kw, 269kx, 269ky, 269kz, 269la, 269lb, 269lc, 269ld, 269le, 269lf, 269lg, 269lh, 269li, 269lj, 269lk, 269ll, 269lm, 269ln, 269lo, 269lp, 269lq, 269lr, 269ls, 269lt, 269lu, 269lv, 269lw, 269lx, 269ly, 269lz, 269ma, 269mb, 269mc, 269md, 269me, 269mf, 269mg, 269mh, 269mi, 269mj, 269mk, 269ml, 269mm, 269mn, 269mo, 269mp, 269mq, 269mr, 269ms, 269mt, 269mu, 269mv, 269mw, 269mx, 269my, 269mz, 269na, 269nb, 269nc, 269nd, 269ne, 269nf, 269ng, 269nh, 269ni, 269nj, 269nk, 269nl, 269nm, 269nn, 269no, 269np, 269nq, 269nr, 269ns, 269nt, 269nu, 269nv, 269nw, 269nx, 269ny, 269nz, 269oa, 269ob, 269oc, 269od, 269oe, 269of, 269og, 269oh, 269oi, 269oj, 269ok, 269ol, 269om, 269on, 269oo, 269op, 269oq, 269or, 269os, 269ot, 269ou, 269ov, 269ow, 269ox, 269oy, 269oz, 269pa, 269pb, 269pc, 269pd, 269pe, 269pf, 269pg, 269ph, 269pi, 269pj, 269pk, 269pl, 269pm, 269pn, 269po, 269pp, 269pq, 269pr, 269ps, 269pt, 269pu, 269pv, 269pw, 269px, 269py, 269pz, 269qa, 269qb, 269qc, 269qd, 269qe, 269qf, 269qg, 269qh, 269qi, 269qj, 269qk, 269ql, 269qm, 269qn, 269qo, 269qp, 269qq, 269qr, 269qs, 269qt, 269qu, 269qv, 269qw, 269qx, 269qy, 269qz, 269ra, 269rb, 269rc, 269rd, 269re, 269rf, 269rg, 269rh, 269ri, 269rj, 269rk, 269rl, 269rm, 269rn, 269ro, 269rp, 269rq, 269rr, 269rs, 269rt, 269ru, 269rv, 269rw, 269rx, 269ry, 269rz, 269sa, 269sb, 269sc, 269sd, 269se, 269sf, 269sg, 269sh, 269si, 269sj, 269sk, 269sl, 269sm, 269sn, 269so, 269sp, 269sq, 269sr, 269ss, 269st, 269su, 269sv, 269sw, 269sx, 269sy, 269sz, 269ta, 269tb, 269tc, 269td, 269te, 269tf, 269tg, 269th, 269ti, 269tj, 269tk, 269tl, 269tm, 269tn, 269to, 269tp, 269tq, 269tr, 269ts, 269tt, 269tu, 269tv, 269tw, 269tx, 269ty, 269tz, 269ua, 269ub, 269uc, 269ud, 269ue, 269uf, 269ug, 269uh, 269ui, 269uj, 269uk, 269ul, 269um, 269un, 269uo, 269up, 269uq, 269ur, 269us, 269ut, 269uu, 269uv, 269uw, 269ux, 269uy, 269uz, 269va, 269vb, 269vc, 269vd, 269ve, 269vf, 269vg, 269vh, 269vi, 269vj, 269vk, 269vl, 269vm, 269vn, 269vo, 269vp, 269vq, 269vr, 269vs, 269vt, 269vu, 269vv, 269vw, 269vx, 269vy, 269vz, 269wa, 269wb, 269wc, 269wd, 269we, 269wf, 269wg, 269wh, 269wi, 269wj, 269wk, 269wl, 269wm, 269wn, 269wo, 269wp, 269wq, 269wr, 269ws, 269wt, 269wu, 269wv, 269ww, 269wx, 269wy, 269wz, 269xa, 269xb, 269xc, 269xd, 269xe, 269xf, 269xg, 269xh, 269xi, 269xj, 269xk, 269xl, 269xm, 269xn, 269xo, 269xp, 269xq, 269xr, 269xs, 269xt, 269xu, 269xv, 269xw, 269xx, 269xy, 269xz, 269ya, 269yb, 269yc, 269yd, 269ye, 269yf, 269yg, 269yh, 269yi, 269yj, 269yk, 269yl, 269ym, 269yn, 269yo, 269yp, 269yq, 269yr, 269ys, 269yt, 269yu, 269yv, 269yw, 269yx, 269yy, 269yz, 269za, 269zb, 269zc, 269zd, 269ze, 269zf, 269zg, 269zh, 269zi, 269zj, 269zk, 269zl, 269zm, 269zn, 269zo, 269zp, 269zq, 269zr, 269zs, 269zt, 269zu, 269zv, 269zw, 269zx, 269zy, 269zz	PC 11225, et seq.  Register of offenders PC 290	Indecent Exposure PC 314	Indec. Ex- hibit... children participating Lab 1308	Nuisance: "lewdness, assignation or prostitu- tion..." PC 11225  Nuisance: "indecent or offensive to the senses." CC 1479  Public nuisance: "indecent" CCP 731	PC 314.6 315.6					

When taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance." PC 311 (a)

<b>CONNECTICUT</b>										
11-11 et seq.	11-11 et seq.	Indecent Liberties 40-2-32	Indecent Liberties 40-2-32	Nuisance: "lewdness, assignation or prostitu- tion" 29-15-2	40-9-1 et seq. 40-6-501	40-9-3 40-9-15	Loss of civil rights 29-10-18	40-9-4 et seq.	40-9-11	40-9-11
11-12 et seq.	11-12 et seq.	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15

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<b>CONNECTICUT</b>										
11-11 et seq.	11-11 et seq.	Indecent Liberties 40-2-32	Indecent Liberties 40-2-32	Nuisance: "lewdness, assignation or prostitu- tion" 29-15-2	40-9-1 et seq. 40-6-501	40-9-3 40-9-15	Loss of civil rights 29-10-18	40-9-4 et seq.	40-9-11	40-9-11
11-12 et seq.	11-12 et seq.	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15

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<b>CONNECTICUT</b>										
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11-12 et seq.	11-12 et seq.	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15	Indecent Exposure 40-9-15

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[illegible]

OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUBANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	INCEST	PROSTITU- TION
					INDEX					
Minors 10-2004 et seq.	Open lewd- ness 10-2101	10-4101 "Indecent Nuisance" 10-111	Nudity defined; 10-1100 (2)  Nudity (minors) 10-1100 (1) (a)  "Nudity" See obscen. definition 10-2105 (8)	Minors Nuisance "Injurious to morals..." Indecent..." 10-101 "Injurious to public mor- als..." 10-105  Obscenity unjoined 10-1513 et seq.  Injunction obscenity 10-2101  Nuisance; "Prostitu- tion, lewd- ness, assau- lter or other indecent acts, or house of ill fame" 10-104	10-4001 31-503 31-604	Lowd cohab- itation 10-6004	10-6000 6000	10-6002 31-205	10-2101  Nuisance 10-104	

Minors to  
mean defined:  
" (1) The quality of any material or of any performance or of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or pseudo-scientific abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (3) is clearly without redeeming social importance for minors. (2) The quality of any material or of any description or representation, in whatever form, which, as a whole, has the dominant effect of substantially arousing sexual desires in persons under the age of eighteen (18) years." 10-2105 (8)

10-2-10 et seq.	10-2700 et seq.	Lewd expo- sure: "Pub- lic indecen- cy..." in- cludes... (1) sexual in- tercourse... (2) device sexual in- tercourse... (3) lewd ex- posure of the body... (4) lewd fond- ling of the body... 10-11-9  Indec. lib- erties w/child 10-11-4 et seq.	Nudity (minors) 10-11-31 (b) (1) "Nudity" See obscen. defin. 10-11-20 (a)	Nuisance: "Lewdness, assauilment or prostitu- tion" 100 1/2-1	11111111 134-16.4 10.5 Passengers 114-27.49	10-11-7	10-11-8	10-11-2	10-11-11 10-11-10	10-11-14 et seq.  Nuisance 10-27-1 100 1/2-1
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...considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters..." 10-11-20 (b)

10-200 et seq.	Lewd matter 10-2003	Exposure: 10-2001	Nudity defined: 10-817 (b)	Nuisance: "Lewdness, assauilment or prostitu- tion" 9-270 et seq.	In presence of female: 10-2901  telephone 10-4944	10-4207	10-4207 4200	10-4221	10-4206	10-4220 et seq.  Nuisance 9-2701
10-207 et seq.	Nuisance: 9-2700	letting stallions in public 10-2002	Nudity (minors) 10-819							
10-200 et seq.	Immoral places 10-4110									
10-200 et seq.	10-4110									

Means defined:  
"...lewdness, lewd, indecent, or lascivious..., instrument or article of indecent or immoral use..." 10-2003

OBSCENITY	LEWITNESS	INDICENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUBANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	UNCERT	PROFEN- TION
725.3 at seq.	725.1 at seq.	Exposure 725.1		Witnesses "...inde- cent..." 687.1	Profane and indecent 725.1	702.1	vicious... cohabita- tion 725.1	705.1, .2	704.1	714.1 at seq.
Minors 725.6	Lewd act in presence of child involving nude or childhood 725.3, .3									

Obscene defined: "...obscene, indecent, immoral, or impure... which would tend to the corruption of the morals of youth or others..." 725.1 (lewd, play, exhibition, show or entertainment) . "...obscene, lewd, indecent, lascivious, or filthy... or article of indecent or immoral use..." 725.5 (book, pamphlet, picture, writing or instrument).

					LOUISIANA					
21-3301	Lewd and lascivious behavior; "sexual in- tercourse... being viewed ...or the ex- posure of a sex organ..." 21-3306	Exposure: 21-3506	See obscen. definition 21-4301 (X) (a)	"Endangers ...public health" 21-4113	In films 51-112 (prescribed 1970) telephone 21-4113	21-3307	21-309 23-128 (repeated)	21-3305 aggravated sodomy 21-3506	21-3302	21-301 at seq.
Minors 21-3301 a										

Obscene defined: "...considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion, sodomy or masochism, and the material is patently offensive and utterly without redeeming social value..." 21-4301 (X) (a)

					KENTUCKY					
436.090 at seq.	436.075	Exposure lacking guile 436.148	"Nudity" See ob- scenity definition 436.101 (c)	Exposition, obscene matter 436.570	96.170 telephone 436.107 swearing profane cursing 431.000 436.150 train 377.260 437.000	436.070	436.070	Sodomy buggery 436.060	436.060	436.075 Witnesses 381.001
Minors 436.101 (2) at seq. and 436.540 at seq. Public feature crime 436.130	Exhibiting stockings, jock or ball 436.170	Indecent practices 435.103 (prescribed 1970)								
See offenses against mar- italty"										
Illicit con- tents 436.540 at seq.										

Obscene defined: "...to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter taken as a whole, is a prurient interest, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." 436.101 (c)

					LOUISIANA Civil Human law State					
14.100	Disorderly conduct 14:93	Contrib. to delinquency "place where sexually indecent and obscene ma- terial... is offered... or exhibited" 14:93	Nudity defined: 14:92.2 A (2)	Obscenity, Nubance "recog- nition, pro- stitution or obscenity" 13:471	14:93 telephone 14:285 45:1160 Language or gestures 14:180	(indexed under other topics)	14:89	14:78	14:82 at seq.	
Minors 14:91.11 14:93.2	Exhib. of minors 23:251									
Pro-emption of regula- tion 14:92.3		Indecent behavior 14:88 Public moral 14:281 at seq.								

Obscene  
defined:

- (1) Exposure of one's person in a public place... that sex organ may be seen... by another... with the intent of arousing sexual desire.  
(2) Production (of matter)... with the intent to primarily appeal to the prurient interest... of any lewd, lascivious, filthy or sexually immoral (matter)... (4)... any lewd, lascivious, sexually indecent dancing, lewd, lascivious or sexually indecent posing, lewd, lascivious or sexually indecent body movement..." 14:306 A

MINNESOTA	LEWENESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUISANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE MAINT.	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	INCEST	PROSTITU- TION
1-1961 1-1962	17-3441	17-301	Nudity defined: 17-440	Nuisance: "Places re- sorted to for lewdness" 17-2741	Indecent language profanity and offensive language 17-452	17-101	17-1543	17-3001	17-1581	17-3051
Obscene defined: "...illustrations of ...sadism, masochism, sexual perversion, hostility or lust, or obscenity, indecency, immorality..." 17-2901										

MARYLAND	LEWENESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUISANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE MAINT.	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	INCEST	PROSTITU- TION
4-1 1-1961	Defined 27-16	Indecent exposure 27-122	Nudity proscribed and defined 27-416 A-G	Injection obscenity; circus etc. and equity etc. 27-418 A	Profanely cursing in streets 27-121	for divorce 16-34	Abduction for fornic. 27-1	27-553 554	27-335 390 381	27-1 et seq.  27-135 429 429 431 575
Blasphemy 27-12 telephone 27-555A										
Obscene defined: "... 27-418 (held to give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and to mark boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and jury to administer the law. Levin v. State, 1 Md. App. 139, 238 A. 2d 487 (1967).)										

MASSACHUSETTS										
	General	Indecent Exposure	Nudity:	Obscenity,	Felony	272-04	272-18	272-34	273-17	273-33
	Exhibitions	272-53	See obscenity definition	petition in equity	obscene	et seq.	et seq.			et seq.
71-204	"lewd, obscene, indecent, immoral or lascivious show ... or tending to corrupt morals of youth..."		272-28 (par. 3)	272-28C	language			Unnatural and lascivious acts		Nuisance
71-206		Devices for indecent purposes		Nuisance	272-31			273-35		139-4
71-207		272-31		"prostitution, association or lewdness"	272-31			38A		
71-208				139-4	Blasphemy			277-45		
71-209					272-35					
71-210					Obscene language of sporting event					
71-211					272-36A					
71-212					Arrest for using					
71-213					272-69					
71-214					telephone					
71-215					369-14A					
71-216										
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OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL SURANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SOBRIETY	INCERT	PROFAN- CY
617.341 at seq. Minors 617.393 Village power to restrain 617.321	gross lewd- ness and lascivious behavior 617.33	Lewd ex- posure 617.33 Indecent exposure 617.35 ...331	Nudity defined 617.391 (3) Nudity (minors) 617.393 (b)	Obscenity: Village power to restrain and punish 617.321 Obscenity Public Nuisance 606.74	Language prosecutive of assault 615.15 telephone 614.75	617.15 (repealed)	617.16 (repealed)	609.393 Hostility 609.394	617.13	617.36 at seq. repealed
Obscenity is harmful to minors; urgent need to prevent commercial exposure. 617.391 (b)(3)-(5)										
Minors pro- hibit riding certain, etc. 617.397										

Obscenity defined: "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests." 617.341

OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL SURANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SOBRIETY	INCERT	PROFAN- CY
11-2674-11 at seq. Maximum penalties and dispatch 11-2674-10 Supplied 11-2674-10 equity rules in procedure 11-2674-09 Scientist presumption 2674-15	Public or lack in public view 11-2181	"private parts" ex- posure 11-2390 Obscene indecent images substitution 11-2386	Nuisance "lewdness, assignment or prostitu- tion" 11-2666 Obscenity injoined 11-2674-10 Obscenity action in Chancery at 11-2674-04 rules of civil procedure per- taining to equity cases are appli- cable 11-2674-08	Nuisance "lewdness, assignment or prostitu- tion" 11-2666 Obscenity injoined 11-2674-10 Obscenity action in Chancery at 11-2674-04 rules of civil procedure per- taining to equity cases are appli- cable 11-2674-08	"Profanely scurrilous or coarse... vulgar and indecent language... 11-2391 telephone 11-2381.5	11-2998 at seq.	11-2998 at seq.	(not re- spected)	11-437 439	11-211 at seq. Nuisance 11-210

Obscenity defined: "...to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole tends to prurient interest." 2674-01

OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL SURANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SOBRIETY	INCERT	PROFAN- CY
563.270 at seq. Search and seizure 563.300 at seq. 563.360 Minors 563.310 Enjoined 563.295	563.430 563.150	Exposure to minors 563.100 Exposure 563.190	Obscenity enjoined 563.285	Vulgar obscene or indecent pleadings in news- paper 563.390	563.190		563.230	Salmon 563.220	563.30 at seq. Nuisance "lewd- ness" 563.31	

Obscenity defined: 1. "...devoted totally to...scandalous, lewdness, lascivious, assignments, imputations between men and women and (sexual conduct of persons..." 563.270; 2. "...obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent or lascivious...or other publication of indecent, immoral or scandalous character...or publish in any newspaper any vulgar, scandalous, obscene or immoral pleadings or contents..." 563.280

OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL SURANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SOBRIETY	INCERT	PROFAN- CY
94-3601 at seq. censure authorised 94-3604 94-3608	lewdness 94-3603	Indecent exposure: 94-3603 "private parts"	Wolfsbane: "lewdness or offensive be- havior" 57-106 57-108 94-1006 at seq. 57-110 57-103 Nuisance: "lewdness, assignation, prostitution, gambling, (illegal) wine rooms, (illegal) narcotics, or other illegal acts prohibited by title 94 chapters 24 and 26." 94-3601	Flag level or obscene or words 94-3603 (3)	94-4107 94-4107	94-4109 94-4110	43-105 94-405	94-3601 at seq. Nuisance 94-3601		

Obscenity defined: "...to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." 94-3601





OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUSSANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	INCEST	PRO- STITUTION
<b>NEW JERSEY</b>										
2A:115-3 et seq.	Open lewd- ness or im- pudic act...	Exposure: 2A:115-1		Nuisance: "gather... for purpose of profiting therefrom" 2A:156-3 220 N.J.L. 1961	2A:140-3  Indecent com- munications to female 2A:115-4	2A:14-7  2A:29-1	2A:139-1	2A:143-1 -3	2A:154-1 et seq.	2A:115-4 et seq.
Pandering 2A:115-1.2	tending to debauch morale 2A:115-1	Indecency in publica- tion 2A:115-3		Municipal power 40:72-3						
To minors 2A:115-1.3 115-3.1				Obscenity injunction 2A:115-3.5						
Obscene comic books "...hate factor in impeding the physical and mental development of our youth and constitute a clear and present dan- ger to the people of the State." 2A:115-3.3				Nuisance: "prostitution, lewdness, or assignation" misdemeanors 2A:133-1						
Prompt injunction 2A:115-3.6										

Obscenity:  
1. Legislative findings: "The Legislature finds that the standards of obscenity now enunciated in chapter 115 of Title 2A of the New Jersey Statutes are outdated and supplemented in recent years is unnecessarily permissive and a hindrance to effective legal action against obscene literature. The Legislature further finds that such unnecessary permissiveness has resulted from the incorporation into New Jersey Statutes of language from influential opinions authored by certain United States Supreme Court Justices; which language, however, does not represent binding majority decisions of the Supreme Court and, accordingly, need not bind the Legislature or the Judiciary of this State." 2A:115-1.1

2. Obscene defined: "...that which to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, when considered as a whole, taken its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest." 2A:115-1.1

<b>NEW MEXICO</b>										
Power of municipal- ities to suppress 16-21-12 16-17-14	Expense 46A-9-8		Nuisance: "injurious to public... morals..." 46B-9-1		46B-10-2			46A-9-3	46A-10-3	46A-11-1 et seq.
<b>NEW YORK</b>										
Penal Code 235.06 et seq.	Indecent exhibitions Educ 2215-c	Nudity defined PC 235.30 (2)	Obscenity injunction CPLR 4350	Obscene postures or lang. Penal Code 240.30	Penal Code 235.17			Penal Code 130.00	Penal Code 255.15	Penal Code 130.01 et seq.
Stricter prosecutions PC 235.10 PC 235.22	At fairs or expositions Educ. and M 298		Obscenity town's power to prohibit Towns 136 (11)	Abusive or obscene language in public Penal 240.21						Penal Code 130.01 et seq.
to minors PC 235.30 PC 235.31	revocation of license for, vehicles and T. 594		Nuisance: "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution" Pub H 2335							Penal Code 130.01 et seq.
Motion Picture films Educ. 182-a	Indecency injunction Crim 53-a									Penal Code 130.01 et seq.
Seizure and injunction Penal 410.06										Penal Code 130.01 et seq.

Obscenity  
1. Constitution. (liberty of conscience not to exclude acts of lewdness.) Const art 1, Sec. 3

2. Obscene defined: "... (a) considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or  
exhibition, sodomy or masturbation, and (b) it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matter,  
and (c) it is utterly without redeeming social value." Penal Code 235.06

<b>NORTH CAROLINA</b>										
14-190.1 et seq.	Lewd women within three miles of colleges 14-190	Indecent exposure 14-190.9	(see Indecent Nuisances: "lewdness, assignation prostitution, gambling, or illegal sale of) whiskey or narcotic drugs" 14-1 et seq. Obscenity Injunction 14-190.2	Profane or indecent language 14-195  telephone 14-195 profane or obscene language on highways 14-197	14-194	14-194	14-177	14-178 179	14-178 179	14-178 179
to minors 14-190.7 190.8		Indecent exposure, immoral shows 14-190								14-178 179
Adversary proceedings 14-190.5 & injunction										14-178 179

Obscene defined: "... (1) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and, (2) the material is  
intended or likely to offend because it affronts contemporary national community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual  
matters; and, (3) the material is utterly without redeeming social value; and, (4) the material as used is not protected or privileged under  
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina." 14-190.1 (b)

[illegible]

[illegible]

Obscene defined: 12. "...obscene filth, indecent, lecherous, lewd or unfit..." 31-1046.0; 1. "...to the teenage person, applying contemporary community standards, the contrast between the of the material taken as a whole appears to pervert interest..." 31-1046.12 (other word defined: filthy, indecent, lecherous, and lewd 31-1046.12); 3. "... 'obscene literature'...any literature offensive to the chastity or modesty, depressing or poisoning to the mind or view something that purity and decency forbids to be exposed, or...casts back which are not suitable and beneficial to the education, welfare, and character building of the children of Oklahoma..." 31-1046.1 (b)

[illegible]

defined: "...if, considered as a whole, its predominant theme appeals to prurient interest, and if it is patently offensive and goes substantially beyond the customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matter with relevance to ordinary persons." 387.331 (3)

[illegible]

defined: "...that which, to the average person applying contemporary community standards, has as its dominant theme, taken as a whole, an appeal to prurient interest." 19-4534

OBSCENITY	LEWENESS	INDICENCY (Impr. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL TURPITUDE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICATION	SODOMY	EXCIBY	PROSTITUTION
<b>INDIANA</b>										
11-1 et seq.	Lewenness 10-1-1 11-10-1	Promotion of obscene shows 11-31-14	Nude figures (minors) 11-31-14 11-31-10	Nuisances: "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution" 11-30-1 10-1-1 et seq.	11-1-12 13	11-5-2	11-24-3	11-10-1	11-6-4	11-43-1
11-1-1 et seq.	"lewd" see obscenity definition 11-31-10	"Indecent" see obscene definition 11-31-10		Advertising along high- way 14-10-42	11-11-3		Indecent formation 11-6-6		11-1-1 et seq.	11-34-1 et seq.
11-10-1 11-10-1				Obscenity injunction 11-31-13						Pandering 11-34-3
11-10-1 11-10-1										Nuisance 11-30-1
<p>Terms defined: 1. "...obscene..." 11-31-1; 2. to minors; "...devoted to, or is principally made up of descriptions of illicit sex or sexual activity or which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, or indecent, or which consists of pictures of nude or partially nude figures posed or assumed in a manner to provoke or arouse lust or passion or to exploit sex, lust or perversion...or instrument of indecent or immoral use..." 11-31-1</p>										
<b>SOUTH CAROLINA</b>										
16-1 et seq.	Nuisance 10-10-1 et seq.	Indecent exposure 16-413		Nuisances: "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution" 10-10-1	Obscene message to women 16-553 telephone 16-553.1	16-406 et seq.	16-406 16-409	16-417	16-408	16-409 et seq.
16-413	Receive for purpose of lewdness 16-409 (7)	Exhibiting indecent pictures 16-413		Nuisance "dangerous to human health" Vol. 17, §220	grounds for divorce 16-101		Disqualifies voter 16-62 92			Nuisance 16-1001
16-413				Obscene injunction 16-416						
<p>Terms defined: "...obscene, indecent or improper print (etc.)...manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth..." 16-414</p>										
<b>SOUTH DAKOTA</b>										
13-1-1 et seq.		Indecent exposure falsely 11-24-1 et seq. 11-24-2.1		Municipal power to remove 9-20-13	Obscene language 22-13-7	22-23-17 10		13-1716	22-23-19 22-23-20	13-1717 et seq.
13-1-1 et seq.				Zoning 11-4-7	Obscene or lascivious language in presence of women or children (also tele- phone) 22-24-5	Grounds for divorce 22-4-2			25-1-6	Nuisance 11-10-10
13-1-1 et seq.		Outraging public decency and "injurious to public morals" 22-24-6								
13-1-1 et seq.		Promoting indecent exposure 22-24-2								
<p>Singing, speaking obscene song, word, etc. 22-24-16</p>										
<p>Terms defined: "(1)...that which, by contemporary standards as hereinafter set forth, considered as a whole, has as its dominant theme purpose to appeal to prurient interest. (2) Prurient interest is defined as a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and which as a matter of state public policy is clearly without redeeming social importance." 22-24-11</p>										

OBSCENITY	LEWDNESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUBILITY	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	IMPURITY	PROBITY
39-3001 et seq.		Municipal power to prohibit indecent exhibitions 9-301	Nudist colony forbidden 39-3000	Nuisance: "includes the laws of decency" 9-2001 2903 35 Tenn. app. 450	13-007 Obscene language 39-3001 39-3001 39-3001	13-3001	33-3901	39-707	39-706 706	39-3001 et seq.
to minors 39-1012 et seq.			Nudity defined 39-1011		39-3001					
Injunction 39-3005				Obscenity injunction 39-3005						

Obscene defined: "...obscene language or obscene prints... manifestly tending to corrupt the morals..." 39-3001

					TELEPHONE					
Title 10 Penal Code PC 127 et seq.	Level witness in theater PC 115	Indecent exhibition PC 115	Nudity: sex defini- tion of prurient interest"	Common nuisances "drinking, gambling, prostitution"	Obscene language PC 474 3154 d-2	PC 489 500 491	PC 503 504	PC 534	PC 493 et seq.	Penal Code 130 et seq. 907 600 607 1179 et seq. 1121 a Nuisance 1444
Adversary hearing PC 127 (10)	Lewdness defined PC 607	Indecent exposure PC 535 G	PC 127 (10)	4644	Telephone PC 475					
Municipal regulation allowed PC 127 (13)		Exposure to infant PC 474 535a		Obscenity injunction PC 127 (13)						
Obscenity injunction PC 127 (13)		Indecent exhibitions, films PC 612								
Comic books PC 128		Exposure public grounds PC 661								

Obscene defined: "(a) ...material (a) the dominant theme of which, taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest; (b) which is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters and (c) which is utterly without redeeming social value." "(b) 'Prurient interest' means a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." title 10, Penal Code, § 127 (1) (b) (ii) (B)

					ITINER					
76-39-5 et seq.	Open and gross lewd- ness; asso- ciating in lewd or las- civious or obscene manner 76-39-1(1)	Indecent exposure (includes.) 76-39-5 76-39-13	Nudity: sex defini- tion of obscenity 76-39-11	Nuisance: "...indecent or offensive to senses..." 76-39-1	Bingo, bal- led, or other lewd or obscene words in public place 76-39-5(3) 76-39-13	76-33-3	76-33-5 (includes.)	76-33-21	76-33-4	76-33-11 et seq. 76-33-10 76-33-10 76-33-11 76-33-1 City pass to register 39-3-1 Nuisance 47-1-1
seizure 76-39-7										
Injunction 76-39-10										
Obscenity to minors 76-39-5 (1)										
Hard-core pornography to minors 76-39-5 (8)										
Constructive knowledge 76-39-6										
Local regu- lation author- ized 76-39-15										

Obscene defined: "...whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material or the conduct taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest..." Prurient interest shall mean a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and to matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance." 76-39-11



COMMUNITY	LEWDENESS	INDECENCY (Indec. Ex.)	NUDITY	MORAL NUISANCE	OBSCENE LANGUAGE	ADULTERY	FORNICA- TION	SODOMY	SNECIST	PROSTITU- TION
<u>VERMONT</u>										
13-3601 et seq.	open and gross lewd- ness 13-3601	Exhibiting obscene, lewd or indecent picture...or presents in- decent or immoral show 13-2601		Power of Municipali- ties 34-211		13-311 202 299		Fellation 13-2603 2604		13-2631 13-2632  House of 131 fame 13-2604
to minors 13-3604 et seq.										
Obscene motion pictures 13-1801										
Charges defined: "...lewd or indecent...or which tends to the corruption of the morals of youth..." 13-2601										
<u>VIRGINIA</u>										
18.1-217 et seq.		Indecent exposure 18.1-214 18.1-215 to Child 18.1-214	Nudity; see obscen- ity definiti- 18.1-217 Tennis Displays 27-416 A-G	Obscenity injunction 18.1-214.3 Municipal Power 18.5	Swearing 18.1-237 et seq.  Telephone 18.1-238	18.1-187	18.1-188 Cohabitation, 18.1-193	?	18.1-191	18.1-194 et seq.
May be enjoined 18.1-218.3										
Charges defined: "...that which considered as a whole has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters." 18.1-227										
<u>WASHINGTON</u>										
9.68.000 et seq.	Lewdness 9.79.120	Indecent exposure 9.79.080 9.79.120		Nuisance; "offend public decency" 9.68.010	Indecent or vulgar language 9.68.040  in public conveyances 9.27.030  telephone 9.61.230	9.79.110 120	False charge of 4.24.120	9.79.100	9.79.090	9.79.10  Nuisance 7.48.050
"Erotic material" defined 9.68.40.37.130 60	Sale of lewd publication defined 9.68.40.37.130 60	Indecent exposure 9.68.020		Nuisances; "lewdness, assignation, or prostitu- tion" 7.48.050						
Placing "adults only" label 9.61.060 et seq.	Injunction 7.42.090			Obscenity injunction 7.42.010 et seq.						
Comic books 7.42.010 et seq.										
Charges defined: 1. "Erotic Material": "...material... the dominant theme of which taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest of youth in sex; which is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters or sado-masochistic abuse; and is utterly without redeeming social value;..." 9.68.050 (2); 2. "Prohibited publications": "...detailed account of ...rape, sexual knowledge, seduction, adultery, sodomy or other sexual crime...or (3) Any detailed statement of any evidence of indecent, obscene or immoral acts offered in any trial...or any...account of the actions of any public prostitute (except concerning public welfare)..." 9.68.020										
<u>WEST VIRGINIA</u>										
61-9-1  tending to corrupt youth 61-9-1	Lewd and lascivious cohabitation 61-9-4  open and gross lewd- ness	Indecent exposure 61-9-28  Immoral shows prohi- bited -fairs- 19-7-8		Equitable remedies in aid of chas- tity, moral- ity and de- cency; Article 9 61-9-1 et seq.	Profanity, obscene, indecent or vulgar language (6 telephone) 61-9-18  Profane swearing 61-9-15	61-9-3	61-9-3-  Lewd and lascivious cohabitation 61-9-4-	Crimes against nature 61-9-13	61-9-12	61-9-5 et seq.  Nuisance 61-9-1
Perpetrating publications 61-9-10 61-9-1	Nuisance; Lewdness 61-9-1			Nuisance; "lewdness, assignation, or prostitu- tion" 61-9-1						
Charges defined:										
"...obscene language...or description manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth...or public morals..." 61-9-11										

[illegible]

# A P P E N D I X C

## TIME-MOTION STUDY OF MOTION PICTURE FILM

DEEP THROAT pp. C-2 thru C-29

Exhibited at

The New Plaza

N.Y. Av. & 14th St., N.W.


Washington, D.C.

Sept/Oct. 1972



### O POINTS OF INTEREST

White House	32	House Office Bldg.	77
Capitol	33	Senate Office Bldg.	78
Supreme Court	34	Longworth	79
		House Office Bldg.	80
		Rayburn	81
		Senate Office Bldg.-Old	82
		Senate Office Bldg.-New	83



# "DEEP THROAT"

(Part 1 of 14 Parts)

1  
8/13

DEE

13  
8/13

26  
8/17

37  
8/18

49  
8/18

61  
8/18

4  
8/17

DEEP  
THRO

14  
8/17

26  
8/17

38  
8/17

50  
8/18

62  
8/18

3  
8/17

DEEP  
THROAT

15  
8/17

27  
8/17

39  
8/18

51  
8/18

63  
8/18

4  
8/17

DEEP  
THRO

16  
8/17

28  
8/17

40  
8/18

52  
8/18

64  
8/18

5  
8/17

DEEP  
THRO

17  
8/17

29  
8/17


41  
8/18

53  
8/18


65  
8/18

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 2 of 14 Parts)







(101-102-103-104-105)

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 3 of 14 parts)





(5247 Y AT 14 1960)

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 4 of 14 Parts)






(Serials of TV Series)

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 5 of 14 Parts)








"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 6 of 14 Parts)





(3811) 1000 IN 581209

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 7 of 14 Parts)





(50-01-14-10000)

## "DEEP THROAT"

(Part 8 of 14 parts)








5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15 5/15

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 9 of 14 parts)





(Page 10 of 14)

"DEEP THROAT"

(part 10 of 14 parts)





"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 11 of 14 Parts)





C-23

(Box 15 of 17 letters)

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 12 of 14 Parts)



(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D)

"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 13 of 14 parts)






(5411 19 02 14 35112)


"DEEP THROAT"

(Part 14 of 14 Parts)









D-1

A P P E N D I X D

TIME-MOTION STUDY OF MOTION PICTURE FILM

SCHOOL GIRL pp. D-1 thru D-33


Exhibited at

Trans-Lux

14th & H St., N.W.

Washington, D.C.

Sept/Oct. 1972



O POINTS OF INTEREST

White House	50	Trans-Lux	77
Supreme Court	58	Capitol	78
		Library	79
		Regiment	76
		Trans-Lux	81

SCHOOL GIRL

(Part 1 of 16 Parts)






(B&W 3 of 14 frames)

PHOTOGRAPH

"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 2 of 16 Parts)





(Print 2 of 10 frames)



"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 3 of 16 Parts)



D-7



(KODAK SAFETY FILM)

EXHIBIT 101

## "SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 4 of 16 Parts)





REEL 2 OF 10

REEL 2 OF 10

## "SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 5 of 16 Parts)





"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 6 of 16 Parts)







"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 7 of 16 Parts)





REPRODUCED FROM  
ORIGINAL COPY

"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 8 of 16 Parts)

D-16





REEL 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 9 of 16 parts)

D-18





(SEEK TO OF TO MATHS)

SCHOOL GIST



"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 10 of 16 Parts)

D-20





(SEEK IT OF RE BARRY)

ALVIN KARPIS

## "SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 11 of 16 Parts)





(This is of the same  
subject as the one on the  
opposite page.)

(Part 12 of 16 Parts)





1/17/74 10:10 PM (1/17/74)

1/17/74 10:10 PM (1/17/74)

SCHOOL GIRL

(Part 13 of 16 Parts)







RECEIVED AT 10:00 PM 1/1/73

RECEIVED 1/1/73

(Part 14 of 16 Parts)





1975-1976  
1975-1976

(Part 15 of 16 Parts)





"SCHOOL GIRL"

(Part 16 of 16 Parts)







D-34

D-33



E-1

A P P E N D I X E

TIME-MOTION STUDY OF MOTION PICTURE FILM

"STICKY SITUATION E-1 thru E-33

Exhibited at

Playhouse

15th & H St., N.W.

Washington, D.C.

Sept/Oct. 1972

She got herself into a...

**STICKY  
SITUATION**

She became  
sticky in the heart

**IN COLOR ADULTS ONLY**

12:30, 1:30, 3:10, 4:30

5:30, 7:10, 8:30, 9:50

**PLAYHOUSE**



**○ POINTS OF INTEREST**

White House	01	State Office Bldg	77
Capitol	02	Senate Office Bldg	78
Supreme Court	03	Longworth	79
		House Office Bldg	80
		Reagan	81
		Senate Office Bldg - Old	82
		Senate Office Bldg - New	83

APPENDIX

FILM

## "STICKY SITUATION"


(Part 1 of 15 Parts)



(104-3010-10)

"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 2 of 15 Parts)





"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 3 of 15 parts)

E-6







(Continued on E-8, E-9, E-10)

"STICKY SITUATION"  
(Part 4 of 15 Parts)

E-8






(2016-2-12 10:50:10)

"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 5 of 15 Parts)





UNIT 6 OF 12 (11/11/11)

"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 6 of 15 parts)





Case 1 of 12 12 12 12 12 12



"STICKY SITUATION"

(part 7 of 15 parts)





"STICKY SITUATION"


(Part 8 of 15 parts)






"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 9 of 15 Parts)





## "STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 10 of 15 parts)





REEL 17 OF 20 (17/20)

"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 11 of 15 Parts)

E-22





REPORT TO C. J. B. (1941)

"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 12 of 15 Parts)





"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 13 of 15 parts)





(UNCLASSIFIED)



"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 14 of 15 Parts)






UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA


LIBRARY

"STICKY SITUATION"

(Part 15 of 15 Parts)







11-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100

APPENDIX F

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Portland, Oregon, Journal Article of August 5, 1972 . . . . .	6
Los Angeles Times Movie Ad of September 29, 1972 . . . . .	7
Santa Monica Outlook Article on James R. Haskin, Executive Producer of "Magic Mirror". . . . .	8-11
Reviews on News Articles on "Deep Throat", "School Girl" and "Sticky Situation" . . . . .	12 et seq

**LOVE'S**  
ART  
Singles Club  
A WHOLE NEW WORLD FOR  
WATT BE SEWED  
AND WASHED  
892-2811

**Fiddler on the Roof**  
UPDOWN  
THE FINEST  
SEX COMEDY  
"Everything you  
always wanted to  
know about sex"

**Super 8**  
REPUBLIC  
PALACE

**MELINDA**  
THROAT  
STICKY SITUATION

**MARRIAGE**  
GO-ROUND  
80-4000  
Dancing

**EARL**  
FATHA HINES  
DINNER THEATRE

**NATIONAL**  
1300 E. 8th  
Opening Tues., Oct. 5  
late Oct. 21

**Theatre**  
Singles Club  
A WHOLE NEW WORLD FOR  
WATT BE SEWED  
AND WASHED  
892-2811

**Fiddler on the Roof**  
UPDOWN  
THE FINEST  
SEX COMEDY  
"Everything you  
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**Super 8**  
REPUBLIC  
PALACE

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THROAT  
STICKY SITUATION

**MARRIAGE**  
GO-ROUND  
80-4000  
Dancing

**EARL**  
FATHA HINES  
DINNER THEATRE

**NATIONAL**  
1300 E. 8th  
Opening Tues., Oct. 5  
late Oct. 21

**Starlight Roof**  
ROAST PRIME  
RIB OF BEEF  
DINNER  
\$4.95  
FREE  
PARKING  
Reservations 622-0500  
1400 Old Country Road, Great Neck, N.Y.  
Free Parking in Hotel Drive (after 10:30)

**Starlight Roof**  
ROAST PRIME  
RIB OF BEEF  
DINNER  
\$4.95  
FREE  
PARKING  
Reservations 622-0500  
1400 Old Country Road, Great Neck, N.Y.  
Free Parking in Hotel Drive (after 10:30)

**2-WEEK ONLY 2-9 DAILY**  
**WAREHOUSE**  
**Carpet Sale**  
TOWN & COUNTRY  
CARPETS  
PARTIAL LISTING  
REMMANTS  
REMMANTS

**FAT CITY**  
Society  
HOLLYWOOD  
Complicated  
WONDERFUL WORLD OF HORSES  
Royal Hippos  
Stallions  
MONARCH  
Acrylics, Plush, 30 Colors  
5.99

**TIM BUCKLEY**  
DAVID BLATT  
The Cellar  
ROBBIE DOVE  
The Shepherd  
THE LINCOLN KENNEDY CENTER  
LINCOLN THEATRE  
FRIED Gwynne  
EVA MARIE SAINT  
THE LINCOLN MASK

**WORLD CARPET MILL**  
NYLON POAM BACKED  
COMMERCIAL CARPET  
3.95  
**TOWN & COUNTRY CARPETS, Inc.**  
16601 Oakmont Ave., Gaitersburg, Md.  
942-8800



# ABC, CBS Faked News, Says FCC

By WALTER WINSTON  
Editorial in the News Item Group

**WASHINGTON**—Ten of the seven major radio and television networks were accused of faking news coverage of the Vietnam War by the Federal Communications Commission.

The Federal Communications Commission, which oversees the nation's radio and television stations, said it found that the networks had faked news coverage of the Vietnam War by using pre-recorded news items.

The FCC said it found that the networks had faked news coverage of the Vietnam War by using pre-recorded news items.

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# UA UNITED ARTISTS

Over 100 Years of  
Motion Picture Making  
in Hollywood  
Since 1929

"Asylum"

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National

A SAFE PLACE  
A MUST SEE  
A RARE CLASSIC - A TRUE  
VIRAL / HUMAN EXPERIMENT

WHEN THE LEGENDS DIE

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National

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THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE CHINA CHINESE National



# Porno Sales Here, But Cartel Tied

By JAMES LONG  
General Staff Writer

Portland's pornography industry is dominated by two main cartels with recent ties to the East.

The financial roots of one of the cartels stretched, at least, toward the New York crime syndicate.

THE STORY is sometimes told to follow. It involves a group of no fewer than two different corporations (not count) operating out of Oregon to the East.

The relationship of the different corporations presents a picture as confusing as the life in an Egyptian tomb. Though the two cartels are supposed to have different lines of ownership, they have had one another in the past through financial backing, at least one in the past, a mutual corporate interest.

The chief figure behind Portland's \$30-million-a-year business is Atlanta businessman Michael Thevis, 48.

LESS than a decade, he parlayed three small sex stores and one parlor into a multimillion-dollar international pornography empire involving several outlets in the East.

Source of finance for the business partnership (Jap) Hanna, a gambler and hoodlum who tried out, also had ties with a New York gangster.

At an interview last week with reporter Laraine of the Atlanta Journal, admitted that Hanna had loaned him money on several occasions. Thevis said he had the money back both

FIRST I didn't think about the fact that he was financially able to get a couple of loans," he said.

He always paid him back. In the days when there were no more loans. He only looked into it afterward and I didn't know what I found. So I got him out of our partnership and that was that."

Thevis said he kept in touch with Hanna, however, and that the gambler once referred him to a tax lawyer to handle some problems with the Internal Revenue Service.

On Nov. 17, 1970, Hanna's body, shot full of holes, was found in the trunk of his Cadillac in Miami.

THE MURDER never has been solved, but federal authorities believed it had something to do with the seizure of a shipment of pornography books in North Florida shortly before Hanna was killed.

Thevis, who had received loans from Hanna during their adult bookstore partnership days, was sufficiently well-heeled in 1966 to provide financial backing for Portland's other big pornography dealer, James R. Haskin of Los Angeles.

Haskin, owner of the Eros hardcore theater and bookstore chain, got started with the help of a "line of credit" establishment by Thevis. This was confirmed by Thevis in a 1971 interview in Los Angeles.

BOTH Haskins and Thevis at that time denied they were in business together, but an investigation of corporation records in Oregon, California, Missouri and Georgia shows that one of Thevis' top-ranking employees helped form Haskin's Eros Theater Corp. in Kansas City in 1970.

The employee, Robert Mitchum — not the Hollywood actor — is listed in Missouri as an incorporator of the Eros firm.

Mitchum also was the original president of Thevis' Cine-Matics Corp. in Atlanta, a maker of hardcore sex films, and is now listed as president of Northwest Theatres, Inc., operator of the Pussycat theaters and bookstores in Oregon.

Haskin was listed as president of Eros Theater Corp. in Missouri corporation papers listing Mitchum and Haskin's wife among the incorporators. Haskin is still listed as president of Eros, although Mitchum's name has since been dropped.

HASKIN's other firms include Ecktiographics Corp., a Nevada corporation with headquarters and two offices in Los Angeles; Eros Books, Inc., an Oregon corporation operating the Eros bookstores, and Oregon Bookmark, Inc.

Thevis' interests include Peachtree National Distributors, Global Leasing Corp., Cine-Matics, Pendulum Books, Johnny Reb news stands, Binkler Cigar Stand, Inc., Star Center, 106 Forsythe Corp., M.G.T. Corp., Metro Dance Club, Inc.; Transportation Center of Atlanta, Inc.; Automatic Enterprises, Book Bn, Inc., and Mini-Movies Inc.

Thevis could not be reached by the Oregon Journal for comment. Haskin returned a telephone call but refused to discuss the details of his various enterprises. He referred The Journal to an Atlanta lawyer, Robert E. Smith.

SMITH, one of the attorneys representing Thevis interests in the recent federal seizure of 1,500 allegedly obscene Danish magazines destined for Portland's Pussycat Bookstore, hung up the phone without talking.

A Journal tour of several pornography bookstores indicated that Haskin's wholesale outlet, Northwestern Distributors, handles a quantity of magazine titles listed in a recent issue of Thevis' Peachtree Discount Distributors catalog.

Besides supplying the Eros chain with pornography and plastic sex organ novelties, Northwest also is a source for apparently independent outlets such as the Portland-owned Ginger and Spice bookstore in Garden Home, Idaho.

Ginger Cardwell, a Ginger and Spice official, said the store has been stocked mainly through Northwest.

Portland, Oregon  
Oregon Journal  
(Cir. D 129,666)

AUG 8 - 1971

ALBANY P.C.R. 1971

# Portland Porno Industry Earns Millions

by JAMES LONG  
Staff Writer

Open sex laws have pornography a big business in Oregon.

According to some estimates, Portland area dealers will rake in \$20 million a year from avid public demand for "hardcore" sex films, movies and playthings.

Despite protestations of dealers that business is slumping, there is little evidence that expansion is slowing.

Not until the arrival on the local scene — but hardly a surprise — of the adult industry — is

old Edwin Leslie Lorden, known to his friends as "the Howard of pornography."

Lorden, who began his career as a Los Angeles peep show impresario, weathered the back of an 18-month indeterminate sentence in Oregon prison to escape his present holdings to 250 "adult" theaters and porno shops from Texas to Alaska.

In January the portly tycoon established a movie production company in Portland. Panascope Productions help supply film for his empire.

Lorden could not be reached for an interview, but Journal spoke with his production manager, Nolder, 29, at Panascope headquarters in the town Portland Semler.

Lorden, part owner of the Theater in Portland (he owns the Lombard), Panascope has complete feature-length 35-millimeter "adult" films.

"The goal," he added, "is to put a feature film every day. We also plan to make 20-minute shorts."

Lorden said Panascope has trouble finding actors for Portland-made sex epics. "Men are no problem," he smiled, pulling out a card to show 150 applicants. "As for the chicks, I usually find one and she does the rest."

Lorden said one applicant for a sex film role was the daughter of a local discount store owner. "I couldn't believe he was serious. I asked him if he'd be bashful addressing, and his reply was to scribble right in the spot."

Technical talent is no particular problem, either, Nolder said.

Dan Hoffman, a former KOIN-TV newsmen, was hired to film Panascope's "Westward Ho House," but dropped out before the picture was completed.

Hoffman told The Journal he quit "when they wanted to get down to filming the nitty-gritty." Nolder said Panascope backed out on Hoffman because filming costs were getting too high.

"An average picture costs \$8,000," Nolder said. "Westward Ho House was shot on location at Burns, and it ran up to \$10,000 or \$12,000. I would say \$8,000 would be an absolute minimum for making a film."

According to Nolder, a 35-millimeter hardcore film rents for as much as \$2,000 a week in Dallas or New York. "I don't know how much a picture earns, total," he said. "That's not my end of the business."

Dave Friedman, head of Entertainment Ventures, a Los Angeles film booking company, told The Journal he knows of "five or six" hardcore film producers making movies in Oregon to

avoid California's tougher sex laws.

"They were getting busted right on the set in Los Angeles," Friedman said. "California has an oral sodomy law, and that's what they were using."

He said the California caseload speeded up when hardcore film maker Tom Parker was convicted on sex charges involving children in one of his productions.

"Personally, I don't like hardcore," said Friedman, president of the Adult Film Association. "I'm a showman, and hardcore gives away the third act as soon as the curtain rises."

Despite his alleged personal dislike, Friedman says he books sex films for theater owners because they make money.

MOST OF these films, said Friedman, are low-budget affairs made on speculation or on order from big porno dealers.

"The average 16-millimeter hardcore producer spends \$2,500 to make his

film," said Friedman. "He sells 20 prints for \$20,000. So he runs \$2,500 up to \$20,000 and does this four or five times a year."

Friedman added, "But if he gets busted once, he can drop half his money on legal expenses."

Tracking down hardcore movie producers proved, for Journal reporters, comparable to a cross between a snipe hunt and an effort to interview the real Howard Hughes.

ONE PRODUCER who gave his name as "Bob Gilbert" was reached by telephone in Eugene, and offered a tryout to Journal staffer Or Hopkins. He did not know she was a reporter. He said the part would require nudity.

Later, Gilbert said he was shooting the film on order for a distributor he refused to name. "I do all kinds of films," explained Gilbert. "I do stock footage — a lot of legit stuff for CBS. This is just one more job."

Friedman commented, "I don't know why these guys are so furtive. I can't find them half the time myself. You run into mail drops, telephone numbers of go-betweens — all that kind of stuff. I keep calling them. If you're not doing anything illegal, why keep sneaking around?"

By latest count, 18 movie theaters in Portland show sex films of one kind or another on a regular basis.

The estimated "gross" is something just short of a quarter-million dollars a week.

AT PANASCOPE Nolder declared that audiences are getting tired of near-plotless footage of sexual intercourse and sodomy. "We're thinking about some horror plots," he said.

Nolder said Producer Lorden "insists on high standards" for Panascope films and "won't allow gay films, or films with animals and people, or mixed races."

He smiled, "I guess that's ethics, of sorts, for this business."

Portland, Ore.  
Oregon Journal  
(Cir. D 137/30)

AUG 5 - 1971

Allen's P.C.R. Inc.















## Deep Throat (COLOR)

Hardcore hetero sex feature with humor a plus. Tops in the current market.

Aquarius release of Vanguard (Lou Perry) production. Directed, written and edited by Jerry Gerard. Camera (color), Harry Flecken, sound, Morris (Gottlieb) set decoration, Len Camp. (No other credits). Reviewed at World Theatre, N.Y., June 12, '72 (No MPAA rating). Running Time: 73 MINS.

Pre-opening word on this latest hardcore feature was hot enough to pack the lunch-time show on opening day at N.Y.'s World Theatre. While "Deep Throat" doesn't quite live up to its advance reputation as the "Ben-Hur" of porno pix, it is a superior piece which stands a head above the current competition.

Lensed in Miami on what appears to be a higher-than-usual budget, pic takes a tongue-in-cheek approach to conventional hetero hardcore, dishing out enough laughs with the main course to prove sexpo features need as much comic relief as suspense.

Plot centers on a young lady disappointed because she fails to "hear bells" during her repeated sex bouts with as many as 14 men at a time. A visit to her accommodating doctor reveals that nature has played her another trick. With practice, the heroine finally experiences a moment right out of "To Catch a Thief," with fireworks, bells, etc. In the happy ending, she also finds a young man with credentials equal to her own.

Pic's technical quality is above-par, including sharp color photography and a satirical musical score which spoofs, among other things, Coca-Cola's "It's the Real Thing" television commercial.

Performances are spirited, especially that of the femme lead, and writer-director-editor Jerry Gerard has put it all together with some style. **Varr.**

## Legal Tactics Throat Opts For Full Jury

The adversary hearing for "Deep Throat," originally scheduled for last Friday (8), did not take place as attorneys for the World Theatre, New York, decided to bypass the hearing and opt for a full jury trial.

Police had attempted to seize the "Deep Throat" print three weeks ago but were forced to return it since seizure took place sans an adversary hearing. Lawyers for the World felt such a hearing could result in a judgment finding "probable cause" for an obscenity trial and thus open the World to continuing print seizure until trial date is set. Hope for a better chance with a full jury than with a single judge.

BOX OFFICE 9-11-72

## 'Deep Throat' Voluntarily Off Screen Until Hearing

BINGHAMTON, N.Y.—Attorney Seymour Detsky, representing Cinecom Theatres in Binghamton City Court, has agreed that the circuit will not show the allegedly "obscene" movie, "Deep Throat," again in Broome County until after a hearing Thursday (14). The accord was in consonance with conditions laid down August 25 by Judge Walter T. Gorman.

The X-rated film, "Deep Throat," was seized Monday night, August 21, by Binghamton city police who entered the Strand Theatre on Chenango Street where the movie had been playing three weeks. Strand manager Michael Sabal and operator Binghamton Theatres Co. were charged with second-degree obscenity, a misdemeanor.

The Strand obtained a second print of "Deep Throat" and showed it again Wednesday night, August 23. Police seized the second film before it had completed its 55-minute run.

BoxOFFICE MAY 15, 1972

## EXPLOITATION FEATURE REVIEW

School Girl

Morphic, Inc.

87 Minutes

Rel. Nov. 71

San Francisco-based, this porno feature has sound, color photography and musical scoring as expert as any major feature. What makes it the best of any of this type yet seen is a maximum amount of plot, about 30 minutes' worth. In most of these, the non-erotic footage runs about 5 or 10 minutes. The heroine, a college student, must prepare a paper of an unusual experience for her psychology class. After a sex session with her boyfriend, she buys a sex newspaper and answers several ads. She has relations with an older bachelor, answers obscene phone calls and makes it with a father-son duo. The girl's roommate finds her sexy looks and has intercourse with the instructor of her psychology class. When the heroine brings in her assignment, she says she enjoyed it all. For once, a sex film without guilt. David Reberg directed. Grand prize winner, Amsterdam Adult Film Festival award 1971-72.

Debra Allen, Susan George.

BoxOFFICE SEPT. 25, 1972

Indict Two Memphis Firms  
Shipping Obscene Films

MEMPHIS—Criminal prosecution in the federal court is the next step in the fight against what the government charges is the showing of obscene movies in Memphis. The federal Grand Jury returned indictments in Memphis against two corporations and an officer of one on charges of interstate shipment of obscene movies.

The indictments followed recent federal court hearings, in which Judge Robert McKeown viewed the movies in question in open court and found them obscene.

Charged in the indictments are Art Theatre Guild, Inc., and Arnold Jordan, vice-president, for the shipment from New Jersey to Memphis of "an obscene, lewd, lascivious and filthy motion picture, 'School Girl.'"

The grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Academy Films, Inc., for transporting from Iowa to Memphis the films "Peep Freak," and "The Spy" and from London to Memphis of the films "Lust for Two" and "City Women."

The films, impounded by U.S. marshals since raids in May, are still in federal custody. All defendants, on arraignment, pleaded not guilty.

Each count of the indictments provides maximum penalty of five years in jail and a \$5,000 fine. Larry Parrish, assistant

BoxOFFICE MAY 30, 1972

REFUSES TO CURB COPS,  
D.A. RE 'DEEP THROAT'

New Orleans, Aug. 29.

U.S. District Judge Lausang L. Mitchell has refused to enjoin the New Orleans Police Dept. from seizing "obscene" films from the Plaza Theatre or the Orleans Parish District Attorney's office from prosecuting the defendants arrested by police.

The attorney for the Art Theatre Guild Inc., an Ohio corporation which operates the theatre, sought a permanent injunction against the city and the DA's office resulting from the seizure of a film, "Deep Throat," at the film house July 24.

The ruling permits prosecution to proceed against Kenneth Eastin, manager of the theatre, and John Brazier, the cashier, who were arrested and charged with contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile and exhibiting obscenity to a minor.

Police also seized business records of the house and a cashbox containing about \$1,000.

BoxOFFICE SEPT. 25, 1972

2 Prints of 'Deep Throat'  
Are Returned to Cinecom

BINGHAMTON, N.Y. — Two prints of "Deep Throat," seized by law enforcement officers as "obscene" in August at the Cinecom circuit's Strand Theatre on Chenango Street, have been returned to the corporation. However, according to James M. Barber, Cinecom attorney, there are no plans to exhibit "Deep Throat" in this city until a trial, as-yet unscheduled, has been held to determine the legal status of the film.

Cinecom lawyers Monday (11) waived an adversary hearing that had been slated for Thursday (14) in city court.

## Obscenity Issue

# Pending Before the U.S. Supreme Court Slows Drive on Smut in Times Square

Mayor Lindsay's campaign against pornography in the Times Square area has been slowed for the time being by an obscenity case pending before the United States Supreme Court.

In two cases last week, films at the police had seized in raids on Times Square theaters had to be returned to the theater operators after their lawyers convinced a Criminal Court judge that his authorization of the seizure was illegal. The cases dealt with sodomy.

A score of raids against peep shows in the Times Square area had the shows down for two days, but legal proceedings against the operators were delayed after the operators obtained injunctions barring the police from interfering with the enterprises.

Seymour S. Detsky, counsel for 10 of the operators, sought an injunction, charging that the police entered the peep-show premises without warrants, seized films before examining them and without warrants and without having an adversary proceeding on their alleged obscenity, and used pickaxes illegally to put the peep-show machines out of business.

By agreement with the city's Corporation Counsel, the police are directed not to interfere with the enterprises, pending a trial of the charges of obscenity and the countercharges in Criminal Court next Tuesday.

The deterioration of the area has been widely attributed to the proliferation of movie theaters showing films on sex perversion, peep shows offering film strips involving what

the owners call "soft-core" pornography, unlicensed "massage parlors" and bookshops peddling books, pamphlets, photographs and devices on sexual themes.

Because of the protests of midtown businessmen, including many from the theater district who believe that the spread of pornography shops has hurt their industry, the Mayor ordered members of his administration to meet with representatives of the District Attorney's office last July 12 to plan a long-range campaign against pornography.

But the campaign met with increasing ineffectuality and, last Thursday, the police found themselves powerless to halt the showing of a film advertised as a portrayal of sodomy.

The film was "Deep Throat,"

presented at the World Theater, 153 West 49th Street, two doors east of a church, the Times Square chapel of the Salvation Army. At the request of the police public morals division, Criminal Court Judge Ernst Rosenberger viewed the film with Patrolman Michael Sullivan on Thursday night, then signed an order authorizing the police to seize the film when the theatre closed at 1 A.M. Friday.

A summons was served on the owner of the theater, Robert Sumner, and he was ordered to appear in court later in the day. Mr. Sumner's lawyers argued that Judge Rosenberger acted contrary to law in signing the authorization because he had failed to give the owner an adversary hearing first on whether the film was obscene.

Judge Rosenberger ordered recess while he researched the law. Returning to the bench at 4 P.M., he said he had to confer with the defense attorney, Seymour Detsky, and ordered the police to return the film. However, he also directed that a subpoena be served upon the lawyers to produce the film in court for a further hearing on Sept. 8.

The issue is one that is to be before the Supreme Court before the Supreme Court rehearing. The court has agreed to decide whether a judge has seen an allegedly obscene movie may issue a search warrant to seize it from a theater without first giving the owner a hearing on whether the film is obscene.

At present, a film case goes through laborious appeals to the High Court, which takes years, before the

can act to halt its presentation, enabling, in a case where crime is proved, the operators to profit from their crime before the law may intervene.

In the "Deep Throat" case, the theater owner, Mr. Sumner, substituted a second print of the film and the house opened on schedule at 10 A.M. Friday with no halt in its activity. The film was still being shown yesterday afternoon.

In a second case, however, involving a film titled "Sticky Situation," seized Thursday at the Hollywood Twin I Theater, Eighth Avenue and 47th Street, the film was not shown again after its seizure on Friday. That case also heard by Judge Rosenberger.

Deputy Inspector Joseph Lynch of the public morals division said his men would continue to hand out summons when they found theaters showing peep shows presenting materials held to be obscene.

The injunctions and the Rosenberger ruling only

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DO hereby certify that the following  
is a true and correct copy of the  
original as the same appears on file in the  
Department of the Interior.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal of the  
Department of the Interior at Washington, D. C., this 1st day of January, 1901.

JOHN D. BROWN, Secretary of the Interior.

Approved and for the Secretary of the Interior:

JOHN D. BROWN, Secretary of the Interior.

Approved and for the Secretary of the Interior:

JOHN D. BROWN, Secretary of the Interior.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, D. C., has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following letter from the Secretary of the Interior, Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C., dated the 1st day of January, 1901, and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.

The Commission on the Standard of Living and the Standard of Education in the United States has the honor to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.



# Obscenity Issue

## Pending Before the U.S. Supreme Court Slows Drive on Smut in Times Square

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS  
acquired a copy of the  
Society's new book  
for the time being to  
temporarily delay sending it  
to the United States Supreme

Court. The book, which  
has been filed under the  
name of "The Society's  
Book," is intended to be  
distributed to the public  
and is expected to be  
distributed in the next  
few days.

The book, which is  
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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**

**OCTOBER TERM, 1971**

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**NO. 71-1051**

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**PARIS ADULT THEATRE I, ET AL,**  
*Petitioners,*

**v.**

**LEWIS R. SLATON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY,  
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ET AL,**  
*Respondents.*

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**On Writ Of Certiorari From The  
Supreme Court of Georgia**

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**MOTION OF CHARLES H. KEATING, JR., FOR LEAVE TO  
FILE A BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT  
OF RESPONDENT WITH BRIEF ANNEXED**

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Charles H. Keating, Jr., (hereinafter referred to as Moving Party) respectfully moves, pursuant to Rule 42(3) of the Rules of the U. S. Supreme Court, for leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae in support of the Respondents, Hinson McAuliffe, as Solicitor General of the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia, and Lewis R. Slaton, as District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit.



Moving Party has a special interest in the subject matter of this appeal, having devoted considerable time, study and effort to assisting law enforcement in combating the spread of obscenity in the Nation: first, as the founder and co-counsel for Citizens for Decent Literature, Inc., and more recently as a member of the Presidential Commission on on Obscenity and Pornography. Moving Party is also the appellee in an obscenity case pending before this Court, entitled, "A Motion Picture Film Entitled 'Vixen', Russ Meyer, Eve Productions, Inc., Malibu, Inc., and Clarence P. Gall v. State of Ohio ex rel Charles H. Keating, Jr., October Term 1971, No. 71-599, as to which this Court on January 12, 1972, requested a response.<sup>1</sup> The latter appeal was carried over to the 1972 October Term without this Court having taken action thereon.

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<sup>1</sup>In Moving Party's response thereto, see Motion to Affirm at pages 13-18, this Court was urged to grant plenary review in the "Vixen" appeal for several reasons: 1. The appeal involved a civil matter and was limited to the obscenity vel non issue; and 2. the record presented ideal "facts" for review, which included (a) one of the defendants was Producer Russ Meyer, the "King" (and very first) of the pandering motion picture producers; (b) the testimony of defense witness, film historian Arthur Knight, who candidly traced the erosion which has taken place since Russ Meyer started it all, and Russ Meyer's participation therein: (See also Arthur Knight's "tout" of "School Girls" in the Los Angeles Times "Cinema Theatre" ad of Oct. 7, 1972, at Appendix F, page 3 ) and (c) the testimony of plaintiff's witness, Mr. Melvin Anshell, a practicing psychiatrist and author of "Sex and Sanity," who very logically explained the psychiatric basis for the prescription of obscenity (and this Court's holding in Roth-Alberts, 354 U.S. 476, 485, that it was the universal judgment of civilized nations that obscenity should be restrained). The members of this Court, having viewed "Magic Mirror," produced several years after "Vixen" should make a comparison of the same with "Vixen" (photography, content, musical sound track, etc.) and ask themselves if justice does not require that a case, dealing directly with the producer, be handed down for the enlightenment of and as a warning for those in the trade. See Appendix F, pp 8-11 for Santa Monica article on James R. Haskin, Executive Producer of "Magic Mirror".

The grant of a writ of certiorari herein brings before this Court for oral argument, the first obscenity case dealing with a motion picture film since the grant of a writ of certiorari ten years ago in *Ohio v. Jacobellis*.<sup>2</sup> In *Jacobellis*, this Court reviewed the felony conviction of Nico Jacobellis, manager of the Heights Art Theater in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, for exhibiting the French imported film "Les Amants" (The Lovers) and examined the interdependent "obscenity" and "scienter" issues, which in the following years have continued to plague this Court.<sup>3</sup> Here in the *Paris Adult*

<sup>2</sup>Jurisdiction was first noted at the commencement of the 1962 October Term. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 371 U.S. 808, 9 L.Ed.2d 52, 83 S. Ct. 28 (Oct. 8, 1962). After argument without decision during that term, the case was restored to the docket. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 373 U.S. 901, 10 L.Ed.2d 197, 83 S. Ct. 1288 (Apr. 29, 1963). Re-argument did not occur until late in the 1963 October Term (Apr. 1, 1964) with this Court's no-clear majority decision being handed down on the last day of that term. *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 84 S. Ct. 1672 (June 22, 1964).

The *Jacobellis* decision presents only the law of the case and is not a constitutional precedent which binds this Court. In that decision, Justices Warren, Clark and Harlan dissented and Justices Black and Douglas refused to sit in judgment on the merits and apply the law of the land in *Roth v. U.S.*, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1314, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (June 24, 1957), which holds obscenity legislation constitutional. Of the four remaining Justices, Justice White's vote without opinion can, with reason, be attributed to the criminal aspects of the case and the unfortunate fact that *Jacobellis*, as an alien and convicted felon, would be subject to a denial of citizenship. Compare Justice White's dissenting vote on the same day in the civil case, *Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein* (Tropic of Cancer), 378 U.S. 577, 12 L.Ed.2d 1035, 84 S. Ct. 1909 (June 23, 1964). Justice Stewart erroneously applied a "hard-core pornography" reasoning which this Court, in reviewing a state obscenity conviction in *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U.S. 502, 508, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 61, 86 S. Ct. 958 (Mar. 21, 1966), held *not* to be the law.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, the compromising result reached in the *Redrup* and *Austin* cases, cert. granted, limited to the "scienter" issue in *Redrup v. New York*, 384 U.S. 916, 16 L.Ed.2d 438, 86 S. Ct. 1362 (Apr. 25, 1968), and *Austin v. Kentucky*, 384 U.S. 916, 16 L.Ed.2d 438, 86 S. Ct. 1362 (Apr. 25, 1966), but decided on

Theater case the issues are not so complex - only "obscenity vel non" is being litigated, and that in relation to the fundamental power of a sovereign state, functioning in a civilized society, to proscribe the same as a matter of law, so as to preserve good public morality.

Moving Party submits that the real import of the appeal herein will be apparent only to those members of this Court who are willing to recall to mind from memory the vastly superior state of public morality (sexual) which existed when *Jacobellis* was decided just one short decade ago. Succinctly put, when one dwells for too long a period in a dung heap, the reminiscent smell of fresh air has an elusive manner of escaping the memory.<sup>4</sup> Without invoking that

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other grounds in a no-clear majority decision in *Redrup v. New York*, 386 U.S. 767, 18 L.Ed.2d 515, 87 S. Ct. 1414 (May 8, 1967).

The *Redrup* decision presents only the law of the case, and is not a constitutional precedent which binds this Court. In that decision, Justices Harlan and Clark dissented. Of the seven remaining Justices, Justices Black and Douglas refused to sit in judgment on the merits and apply the law of the land in *Roth*, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1949, 77 S. Ct. 1314 (June 24, 1957), which holds obscenity legislation constitutional. Of the five remaining Justices, Justice Stewart erroneously applied a "hard-core" pornography reasoning which this Court, in reviewing a state obscenity conviction in *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U.S. 502, 508, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 61, 86 S. Ct. 958 (Mar. 21, 1966), held not to be the law in state cases.

<sup>4</sup>See the observations of Federal District Judge Peirson Hall, speaking on "The Monster Vice" in *U. S. v. Four (4) Books*, 289 F.Supp. 972 at 973 (Sept. 10, 1968):

"'Vice is a monster of so vile a mien,  
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;  
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,  
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.'"

"The verity of the above quotation is brought home not only by the continually increasing number of periodicals, paperbacks and other printed material glorifying things which most people regard as indecent or obscene, which flood news stands and book-racks, but also, to anyone who has read them, by the recent journeys of the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of 'obscenity' . . . ."

<sup>1</sup>From Alexander Pope's "Essay on Man."